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POLICE FUNDING
Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski*
Abstract
A number of civil rights activists have called for the defunding or
abolition of American police departments. These activists claim that the
United States overinvests in police, leaving fewer scarce resources to
support other government services. Activists also claim that
overinvestment in policing contributes to higher rates of police
misconduct and unnecessary criminalization, particularly in communities
of color.
This Article considers these calls for the defunding of police. It
ultimately cautions against widespread defunding of police and offers an
alternative proposal. Part I brings together multiple national databases on
local government expenditures to evaluate empirically how states and
municipalities fund policing. It shows that local police funding varies
remarkably across jurisdictions. Much of this variation exists because
police departments derive funding primarily from local sales and property
taxes. Because of this funding mechanism, economically disadvantaged
communities most in need of public-safety services can often least afford
them.
Part II argues that the defunding of police departments on a wide scale
may have significant and unintended consequences. This Article argues
that defunding could increase crime rates, hamper efforts to control
officer misconduct, and reduce officer safety. Faced with smaller
budgets, defunded agencies may also seek additional revenue through
potentially harmful means like excessive ticketing and civil asset
forfeitures. Defunding could push the delivery of public-safety services
to the private sector. And defunded agencies may ultimately lower officer
salaries, thereby limiting recruitment and retention of qualified
personnel.
Given these drawbacks, this Article remains skeptical that defunding
will improve policing in many jurisdictions. Instead, this Article argues
that states should fundamentally reimagine how they fund the police.
States should view policing as a public good that ought to be equitably
distributed across the population according to need. Just as some state
legislatures have passed revenue-sharing initiatives designed to equalize
the availability of public goods such as education, so too should states act
to equalize the funding of local police departments according to need.
This would ensure that all localities have minimally sufficient resources
* Stephen Rushin is an Associate Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School
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to investigate crime and promote public safety regardless of the strength
of the local tax base. Additionally, to ensure the quality of policing
services, states should require that each local police department earmark
a specified percentage of its budget for officer training and
accountability. Combined, these regulations of police funding could
ensure that localities have sufficient resources to promote the public good
without drawing limited resources away from other community
initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an extensive
investigation of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) at the request of
former Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan.1 Over a year later, the
1. Sari Horwitz et al., Justice Department Will Investigate Practices of Chicago Police,
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2015/12/06/justice-department-will-launch-investigation-into-practices-of-chicago-police
[https://perma.cc/UG6X-T29Y] (“On the same day that [former Chicago Police Commissioner]
McCarthy was fired, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan wrote a letter to the DOJ urging
them to open an investigation into the police department.”). The investigation began after a county
judge ordered the city to release dashcam footage showing then-Chicago officer Jason Van Dyke
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DOJ issued a 161-page report concluding that the CPD was engaged in a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct in violation of federal
law.2 The DOJ found that CPD officers regularly used excessive force
against suspects,3 failed to implement crisis-intervention or de-escalation
techniques,4 relied on deficient accountability systems,5 and lacked
adequate supervision.6
But one of the most glaring problems identified by the DOJ report was
the CPD’s failure to properly train its officers. As the report explained,
the CPD failed to “provide officers or supervisors with adequate
training,” resulting in officers that were “unprepared to police lawfully
and effectively” and supervisors “who d[id] not mentor or support
constitutional policing by officers.”7 For example, the DOJ found that the
CPD used a thirty-five-year-old video to teach officers about use of force,
created before the United States Supreme Court issued some of the most
integral decisions on the topic.8 The video was not only legally outdated,
it was also inconsistent with the use-of-force standard articulated in the
shooting seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald sixteen times in fifteen seconds without apparent
justification. Id. (noting the McDonald shooting video release as a motivating factor in Madigan’s
letter to the DOJ and the subsequent DOJ investigation); see also Nausheen Husain, Laquan
McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, the Verdict and the Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18,
2019, 7:22 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-graphics-laquanmcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Y7DZ-UHUK] (stating that
Van Dyke shot McDonald sixteen times in fourteen to fifteen seconds, with McDonald lying on
the ground for thirteen of those seconds). As the DOJ later noted, the killing of McDonald was
merely “a tipping point—igniting longstanding concerns about CPD officers’ use of force, and
the City’s systems for detecting and correcting the unlawful use of force.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/9LRN-J2US]. Protestors filled Chicago streets in the
days after the release of the video demanding reform and accountability. See Laura Thoren,
Protestors Gather After Police Shooting Video Released, ABC 7 CHI. (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://abc7chicago.com/news/protesters-gather-after-police-shooting-video-released/1098346
[https://perma.cc/3T2X-QGJQ].
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 23.
3. Id. at 22–37 (concluding that the CPD used deadly force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, used less-lethal force unjustifiably, and engaged in a broader pattern of unlawful
force).
4. Id. at 37–46 (finding that the CPD’s newly implemented de-escalation training and other
similar policy revisions should be expanded and that the CPD has historically failed to provide
officers with adequate crisis-intervention training).
5. Id. at 46–92 (providing extensive details on how Chicago does not have adequate
systems in place to investigate police conduct, investigations of officers are rarely fair and
complete, and the CPD lacks proper policies to prevent officers from deliberately concealing
misconduct, and recommending various policy changes to address these accountability issues).
6. Id. at 93–133 (discussing the failure to implement adequate training, supervision, and
promotion procedures that may hurt officer wellness).
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 95 (“The tactics depicted in the video were clearly out of date with commonly
accepted police standards of today.”).
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CPD’s own internal policies.9 And the DOJ even observed one officer
asleep during the training.10 Unsurprisingly, the DOJ found that only one
in six officers that it interviewed “came close to properly articulating the
legal standard for use of force.”11 This poor training protocol failed to
“weed out low-performing recruits,” resulting in unqualified officers
policing Chicago streets—many of whom went through little formal
training thereafter.12 Additionally, the DOJ found that the CPD’s physical
training facilities were in disrepair.13 The facilities lacked sufficient space
to train the thousands of officers that used them each year,14 and these
facilities were woefully understaffed to meet the growing demand.15
For the CPD to curb its pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, the
DOJ concluded that Chicago needed to substantially increase its
investment in officer training.16 Soon thereafter, former Chicago Mayor
Rahm Emanuel announced that the city would spend an estimated $95
million to build a state-of-the-art training facility to be shared by the
police and fire departments.17 This new 500,000 square feet facility,
located on a thirty-acre site in one of the most economically
disadvantaged areas of Chicago,18 will include a shooting range,
9. Id.
10. Compounding this, the DOJ noted that “[s]everal recruits were not paying attention”
and there appeared to be “minimal” efforts made to engage students during this lesson. Id. The
instructor started the class ten minutes late and ended the class twenty minutes early. Id.
11. Id.
12. Brandon E. Patterson, A $95 Million, State-of-the-Art Police Academy is Chicago’s
Latest Political Battleground, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/
crime-justice/2017/12/chicago-political-battleground-95-million-police-training-academy-rahmemanuel-chance-rapper [https://perma.cc/H7PS-2YJT].
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 103. Perhaps no story better illustrates the level
of disrepair and carelessness than one anecdote about the storage of ammunition and firearms by
the CPD. The DOJ found that the CPD kept guns and ammunitions in a dilapidated former school
building. Id. at 103–04. The armory room, a former school office, was left unlocked with loaded
guns left out in the open in close proximity to training guns. Id. There were no labels or controls
to keep officers from mistakenly grabbing a gun with a live round when they intended to grab a
training gun. Id. at 104.
14. Id. at 103–04 (providing examples of how this space was insufficient for the needs of a
large police department).
15. Id. (discussing that the city’s stated desire to hire 1,000 new officers would “require the
Education and Training Division to run huge classes through the Academy each month” and
explaining that “[t]he Division does not have sufficient personnel” to do this).
16. Id.
17. John Byrne, Mayor Rahm Emanuel Announces Next Step in Police Academy Project, A
Plan that Continues to Draw Criticism, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/politics/ct-met-rahm-emanuel-police-academy-20181116-story.html [https://perma
.cc/N5CC-HHE6].
18. See Fran Spielman, Plan Commission Approves $95 Million Police and Fire Training
Academy, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/2/21/18
355111/plan-commission-approves-95-million-police-and-fire-training-academy [https://perma
.cc/G8GN-ZVZE].
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designated space for officers to conduct simulated training scenarios, and
a driving training course.19 Chicago officials have also promised to
allocate the necessary resources to use this facility to properly train new
recruits and provide regular in-service training for officers currently on
the force.20
Almost immediately after this announcement, local civil rights
activists criticized Emanuel’s plan. Black Lives Matter and other civil
rights activist groups “repeatedly . . . filled the corridors [of] City Hall
with chants of ‘No cop academy!’”21 At one point, protestors blocked
access to City Hall elevators and occupied the building for nearly ten
hours.22 According to these protestors, the new police academy would not
solve the department’s systemic misconduct problem; instead, they
argued that the investment in the police academy would siphon limited
resources away from the local school system, mental health services, and
community programs.23 A website by some of these activists lays out a
thoughtful and compelling case against spending an additional $95
million on a new training facility for police and fire personnel.24 It argues:
“We demand a redirecting of this $95 million into Chicago’s most
marginalized communities instead. Real community safety comes from
fully funded schools and mental health centers, robust after-school and
job-training programs, and social and economic justice. We want
investment in our communities, not expanded resources for police.”25
This ongoing debate in Chicago underscores a broader movement
among civil rights activists across the country. In the wake of highly
publicized and deadly encounters between police and civilians in cities

19. See Heather Cherone, Rahm Pushes Plan to Spend $95 Million on New Police, Fire
Training Academy Through Divided City Council, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:13 PM),
https://blockclubchicago.org/2019/03/13/emanuel-pushes-plan-to-spend-95-million-on-newpolice-fire-training-academy-through-divided-city-council/ [https://perma.cc/79RX-AB82].
20. John Byrne, New Police, Fire Training Facility set for West Side, CHI. TRIB. (July 3,
2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-police-fire-training-met-201
70703-story.html [https://perma.cc/P8Y8-7SW5].
21. See Bryne, supra note 17.
22. See Cherone, supra note 19.
23. See Patterson, supra note 12 (“This and other organizations have also staged protests
and testified at city council hearings, arguing that the money would be far better spent on the
city’s cash-strapped school system, mental health services, and community programs the activists
say will help reduce violence in West Garfield Park and elsewhere—thereby reducing the need
for police intervention.”).
24. About, NO COP ACAD., https://nocopacademy.com/about [https://perma.cc/BC7Q69M7].
25. Id.
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like Baltimore,26 Cleveland,27 Ferguson,28 and countless others, policy
makers have searched for answers to a perceived national epidemic of
police misconduct. Many policy makers have responded by promising to
allocate additional funds to officer training and accountability efforts29
and have made costly investments into technologies such as officer body
cameras.30 Nevertheless, some critics believe that these investments
fundamentally misunderstand the root causes of police violence in the
United States.31 In fact, “[o]ne of the most [controversial portions] of the
Black Lives Matter movement’s platform is the idea of divesting from
police departments.”32 A website associated with the group describes
local and federal investments in policing as “investments in the
criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people.”33 There are simply
too many police officers, they argue, given discretionary authority to
enforce criminal laws in an uneven way that disproportionately

26. See Kevin Rector, The 45-Minute Mystery of Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr.
25, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-gray-ticker-20150425-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6HJ9-E4YT] (describing the death of Freddie Gray); see also German Lopez,
The Baltimore Protests over Freddie Gray’s Death, Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2016/
7/27/18089352/freddie-gray-baltimore-riots-police-violence [https://perma.cc/84TC-HEFW] (last
updated Aug. 18, 2016, 9:38 AM) (noting that the death of Freddie Gray led to protests and an
investigation of the Baltimore Police Department).
27. Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown of the Events that Led to the 12-YearOld’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/
2017/01/tamir_rice_shooting_a_breakdow.html [https://perma.cc/7XX4-6NYB] (providing a
summary of the events leading to the killing of Tamir Rice, which happened shortly before the
DOJ issued its investigatory findings of the Cleveland Police Department).
28. Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/4G9T-D45M] (describing
how the killing of Michael Brown spurred mass protests in Ferguson and a broader national
conversation about police violence).
29. See Gene Johnson & Eric Tucker, After Ferguson, A Push for More ‘De-Escalation’
Training, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/
2014/11/29/after-ferguson-some-push-for-more-escalation-police-training/HtXM7gUmKYT9F
x1Qwd8PxL/story.html [https://perma.cc/MA29-NAK2].
30. See Bram Sable-Smith, After Ferguson, Police Body Cameras Catching On, NPR (Nov.
12, 2014, 5:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/11/12/363547611/after-ferguson-police-bodycameras-catching-on [https://perma.cc/89ZQ-CWHF] (describing the sometimes “huge” cost of
investing in police-oversight technologies such as body cameras, particularly for cash-strapped
departments, and saying that “the attention generated by events in Ferguson may force other
departments to make some difficult tradeoffs”).
31. See, e.g., About, supra note 24.
32. Brentin Mock, The Price of Defunding the Police, CITYLAB (July 14, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/the-price-of-defunding-the-police/533232 [https://
perma.cc/3S7L-8F82] (calling the diversion of funds from police departments to communities
“[o]ne of the most contested” parts of the platform).
33. Invest-Divest, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/invest-divest/
[https://perma.cc/3J5X-CSAH].
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criminalizes poorer communities of color.34 To address the root causes of
police misconduct, they argue that we must disinvest from policing
altogether and, instead, reallocate many of these resources towards
supporting the community.35 Supporters of this viewpoint have described
this position as the defunding or even the abolition of policing as we
know it.36 To further support this position, a coalition of dozens of
prominent racial justice groups issued a careful analysis of police
spending in twelve large American jurisdictions, ultimately favoring a
broad disinvestment from punitive criminal justice systems like local
police departments.37
While this viewpoint is gaining traction among activists and some
academics,38 it has received comparatively less attention by legal
scholars. Legal scholars have extensively analyzed how the law can
combat misconduct by police officers.39 In many cases, though, this
conversation is somewhat detached from a broader understanding of how
we fund policing in the United States and how funding influences officer
accountability and public safety.40 This Article considers these growing
calls for the defunding of police and more generally considers the
relationship between funding and the delivery of policing services.
34. See id.; see also Mock, supra note 32 (providing a detailed summary of this growing
movement).
35. See Invest-Divest, supra note 33.
36. Maya Dukmasova, Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It’s Less Crazy than It Sounds,
CHI. READER (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-abolitionistmovement-alternatives-cops-chicago/Content?oid=23289710 [https://perma.cc/FD3B-5GVN]
(describing how a group of activists in Chicago and elsewhere support the abolition of policing).
37. KATE HAMAJI ET AL., CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM TO THRIVE:
REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR COMMUNITIES 1 (2017), https://populardemocracy.org/
sites/default/files/Freedom%20To%20Thrive%2C%20Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9DJM-WU3H].
38. Perhaps one of the most persuasive articulations of this position among academics was
written by Professor Alex Vitale. See ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING 4 (2017). This Article
is not a response to Vitale’s excellent, detailed, and nuanced book. Instead, it is simply mentioned
here as an example of a particularly compelling piece of scholarship by a noteworthy academic
supporting a position similar to the activists discussed in the Introduction. This Article is not
meant to be refutation of these broader academic positions. In fact, the Authors agree with much
of the scholarship in this field. Rather, this Article offers three unique contributions to the existing
literature: (1) it explores the extent of inequality in the funding of local law enforcement agencies
across the country; (2) it offers an account of the likely drawbacks of widespread disinvestment
that policy makers must consider before moving forward with such initiatives; and (3) it offers an
alternative proposal for how the United States can rethink changes to police funding that the
Authors believe responds to the widespread inequality that currently exists, in a manner that
hopefully will avoid some of the drawbacks of widespread defunding.
39. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 878–79 (2015).
40. Some of the best literature on the funding of American police departments, at least at
the federal level, comes from the excellent work of Professor Rachel Harmon. See id. at 948–49.
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Principally, this Article argues that adequate funding represents an
integral part of a successful police department. It ultimately cautions
against the widespread defunding of the police and offers an alternative
approach to address some of the legitimate concerns raised by defunding
advocates.
Part I empirically evaluates how states and municipalities fund local
law enforcement. To do this, this Article brings together multiple national
datasets on police expenditures. It discovers not a problem of general
overfunding of police departments but, instead, evidence of massive
inequality in police funding from one jurisdiction to the next.41 Take as
an example the 109 separate police departments within Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania.42 Some residents of Allegheny County are served
by police officers working full time, earning an average of $71,000 a
year.43 Other residents in this same county are served only by part-time
officers who are paid around $10 an hour—less than employees at the
nearby Walmart.44 The best-staffed police departments in the county have
ten times as many officers per capita than the county’s poorest
communities.45 And perhaps most importantly, the communities with the
highest crime and greatest need for public-safety services are often the
ones with the fewest and least-paid officers.46 As this Article’s analysis
shows, Allegheny County is not the exception but the rule. All across the
country, massive inequality in the funding of local police departments
means that individuals receive drastically different levels of public-safety
services.47 Much of this variation exists because police departments
derive funding primarily from local sales and property taxes.48 Because
of this funding mechanism, the most economically disadvantaged
41. Shelly Bradbury, At Local Police Departments, Inequality Abounds, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Dec. 18, 2018), https://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/blog/allegheny-countypolice-departments-inequality-budgets [https://perma.cc/3U5R-MXLM] (stating that “inequality
abounds”).
42. Id. (“High-paid, low-paid, full-time, part-time, experienced, inexperienced, wellequipped or poorly equipped—it’s a roll of the geographic dice, according to an analysis by the
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette . . . .”).
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also Walmart Cashier/Sales Hourly Sales in Pennsylvania, INDEED,
https://www.indeed.com/salaries/Cashier/Sales-Salaries-at-Walmart,-Pennsylvania
[https://perma.cc/23JL-5BKN] (showing that the average Walmart cashier in that area made over
$10 per hour).
45. Bradbury, supra note 41.
46. Id. (“[P]olice officers in Allegheny County who face the highest crime and poverty rates
in their communities are also typically the lowest paid . . . . Officers don’t stay as long in
communities with lower pay, and in three of the lowest-paying departments, the average officer
has been on the job [for] only a year.”).
47. See infra Part I (providing details on the extent of inequality in police departments
across the country).
48. See infra Part I.
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communities most in need of public-safety services can often least afford
them. As this Article argues, this realization complicates calls for the
defunding of police. This Article’s analysis reveals widespread inequality
in American police departments—some well-funded and some
underfunded—often in a manner that bears no real relationship to the kind
of public-safety challenges faced in each respective community.
Part II argues that, given the findings discussed above, the widespread
defunding of police departments would likely have significant and
unintended consequences in many communities. In fact, this Article
argues that adequate funding is often a necessary condition for the
delivery of quality policing services. Consistent with a growing body of
empirical literature, this Article argues that defunding could increase
crime rates in a manner that disproportionately affects communities of
color. Defunding could also reduce officer safety and hamper efforts to
control officer wrongdoing, including the ability to properly train,
oversee, investigate, and discipline officers suspected of professional
misconduct. Further, history suggests that police departments facing
budget shortfalls often do not necessarily reduce coercive behavior but,
instead, seek additional revenue through potentially harmful means like
excessive ticketing or civil asset forfeitures.49 And defunded agencies
may ultimately lower officer salaries, thereby limiting recruitment of
qualified personnel.50 Combined, these potential drawbacks ought to give
policy makers pause before they adopt widespread defunding efforts.
Instead, Part III offers an alternative proposal for how policy makers
could fundamentally reimagine the funding of local police departments
to address some (although admittedly not all) of the important concerns
expressed by defunding and abolition supporters. Central to the argument
made by many defunding supporters is the belief that communities spend
comparatively too much of their local budgets on policing relative to
other social services and educational needs.51 For example, as one recent
report highlighted, some communities such as Oakland spend as much as
41% of their general fund on policing—far outpacing their expenditures
on other community resources and services—while others such as New
York have the resources to spend as little as 8% of their general fund
expenditures on policing.52 But this is largely because New York collects
substantially more tax money.53 New York and Oakland actually spend
49. See infra Section II.C.
50. See infra Section II.D.
51. See infra Part III.
52. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37, at 2.
53. Cf. Tonya Moreno, A List of State Income Tax Rates, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/state-income-tax-rates-3193320 [https://perma.cc/QLT8-QVFB]
(last updated Nov. 22, 2019) (comparing the top marginal tax rates among states and
demonstrating that New York has high marginal tax rates).
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almost the same amount of money ($581 and $594 per capita,
respectively) on policing services each year.54 Because of the wealth
inequality between the two cities, and because each city must pay for its
police department primarily through local taxes, Oakland is forced to
spend more of its limited resources on policing, leaving fewer resources
available for other community services.
It is this inequality that frequently undermines the delivery of quality
policing services and leads to many economically disadvantaged
communities siphoning off resources from other social services to
support policing. To remedy this, this Article contends that states should
view policing as a public good to be equitably distributed across the
population according to need. Just as many state legislatures have passed
revenue-sharing initiatives designed to somewhat equalize the
availability of public goods such as education, so too should states act to
equalize the funding of local police departments according to need. This
would ensure that all localities have sufficient resources to investigate
crime and promote public safety regardless of the strength of the local tax
base. This may also begin to correct for the massive inequality that
currently exists between American police departments.
Further, to ensure the quality of policing services in all jurisdictions,
this Article argues that states should require that each local police
department earmark a specified percentage of its budget for officer
accountability. Thus, for example, rather than allowing police
departments to invest all of their budgets into officers engaged in coercive
actions like ticketing, investigatory stops, and arrests, each community
would have to invest a specified percentage of their budget into
overseeing, investigating, and disciplining officers that engage in
misconduct. Combined, these state regulations of police funding would
ensure that localities have sufficient resources to promote the public good
while leaving enough for other community initiatives.
I. THE FUNDING OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
Before critically assessing the calls for defunding police departments,
it is first important to understand the funding of local police departments.
Law enforcement agencies are a heterogeneous group, ranging from tiny
county sheriff offices in small rural communities to mighty police
departments in dense urban areas with millions of residents.55 Some
departments are able to spend lavishly on, for example, technology such

54. Id.
55. See Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Police Executive Opinions of Legal
Regulation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1841, 1861 (2018).
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as helicopters56 and even foreign intelligence operations.57 Others must
make do with more modest means, sometimes at the cost of shutting
down basic operations.58 This variation exists, in part, because most
police departments receive the brunt of their funding from local taxpayers
(primarily local sales and property taxes), with smaller additions from
state grants and smaller additions still from federal programs.59 But again,
there is massive variation and inequality in funding sources.60
This Part presents a descriptive account of law enforcement agency
funding across the country. It focuses on the salaries of law enforcement
officers, per capita expenditures on law enforcement salaries, and
reliance on part-time officers. These areas were chosen because they are
most closely and directly connected to the normative debates surrounding
defunding police agencies, effective policing, and police misconduct.
This Part’s aim is to highlight the geographic variation in police funding
and expenditures. Funding, salaries, and reliance on part-time workers
varies drastically from one jurisdiction to the next.61 The portrait of police
funding that emerges is one of massive inequality.
A. Data and Methodology
The data in this Part comes from two sources that are combined to
draw a nationwide portrait of police funding across more than 20,000 law
enforcement departments, more than 3,000 counties and county

56. See, e.g., Chase Cook, $5.5 Million Ask: Anne Arundel Police Make Case for a New
Helicopter, CAP. GAZETTE (May 24, 2019), https://www.capitalgazette.com/politics/ac-cncounty-helicopter-20190525-story.html [https://perma.cc/2RH7-FW8W].
57. See, e.g., Ali Winston, Stationed Overseas, but Solving Crimes in New York City, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyregion/terrorism-nypdintelligence-crime.html [https://perma.cc/34UV-QFL8] (noting that the New York City Police
Department has “14 New York detectives posted overseas as part of a longstanding
counterterrorism program”).
58. See, e.g., Associated Press, Sheriff Suspends Law Enforcement Due to Lack of Funding,
WKYT (Feb. 9, 2019, 11:53 AM), https://www.wkyt.com/content/news/Sheriff-suspends-lawenforcement-due-to-lack-of-funding-505613111.html [https://perma.cc/QJ6M-J2PR] (“A
Kentucky sheriff has told the local fiscal court he is suspending all law enforcement activities
because of lack of funding.”); Antonia Noori Farzan, An Oklahoma Sheriff Quit in Protest over
Dangerous Jail Conditions. So Did All the Deputies., WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:11 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/20/an-oklahoma-sheriff-quit-protest-overdangerous-jail-conditions-so-did-all-deputies [https://perma.cc/UE85-R8SJ] (“Budget shortfalls
also meant that the department didn’t have any carbon monoxide detectors.”).
59. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37, at 3, 5.
60. Id. at 2.
61. See id. at 1 (noting disparities in police funding and spending across twelve different
jurisdictions in the country).
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equivalents, and many thousand more sub-county government units.62
The first source of data derives from the Annual Survey of Governments
(ASG) from the U.S. Census Bureau.63 The purpose of the survey is to
collect “on a nationwide scale . . . data on [government] revenues,
expenditures, debt and assets of counties, cities, township governments,
special districts and dependent agencies.”64 The survey has been
administered since 1957.65 A full census of local governments has been
conducted every five years (in years ending in “2” and “7”).66 A full
census has a target population of over 90,000 government units.67
Between full-survey years, the Census Bureau conducts partial surveys
based on samples.68 All government units included (either in the partialsample or full-sample years) receive an initial mail out, numerous
reminders, and telephone follow-up calls.69 Survey forms are available
online.70 Response rates tend to be exceptional and far beyond what
62. To the Authors’ knowledge, no legal scholarship has brought these data sources into
dialogue with each other within the context of police funding. A word of caution for future
researchers: obtaining, parsing, consolidating, cleaning, and joining these data is painful and takes
time.
63. See Annual Survey of State & Local Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go0400.html [https://perma.cc/4WUN-6FRZ].
64. See About the Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documen
tation/methodology/2016/2016%20Methodology%20Document%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DHA8-HD9Z].
65. Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/about.html [https://perma.cc/EJP2-5FXZ].
66. Id.
67. Id. (“The target population consists of all 50 state governments, the District of
Columbia, and all active local governmental units (counties, cities, townships, special districts).
There were over 90,000 such units in the current survey year.”).
68. Id. It is also worth noting that the sampling is not random. For example, county
governments with populations of 100,000 or more are always sampled. See id. Similarly, cities
and towns with populations of 75,000 or more are also included in the sample. Id. The yearly
sample size is typically above 10,000 government units. Id. The result of this approach is that
some government units are necessarily surveyed every year; some only every five years; and
others two, three, or four times in a five-year period.
69. See Message Requesting Survey Participation, Steven D. Dillingham, Dir., U.S. Census
Bureau (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technicaldocumentation/questionnaires/historical-forms/2018/alfin_l1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8W2-RV82];
see also About the Annual Survey of Local Government Finances, supra note 64 (explaining
frequency and mode of contact).
70. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES: COUNTY, MUNICIPAL, AND TOWNSHIP 1 (2018), https://www2.
census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documentation/questionnaires/historicalforms/2018/f28_2018_blank.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLB6-2PGE] (worksheet F-28); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES:
MULTI-FUNCTION SPECIAL AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-
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academic researchers could hope for even if they had the resources to
survey that many government units year after year.71 Not surprisingly, the
ASG has been used extensively by researchers in many fields.72
The Census Bureau provides the data online as ASCII fixed-length
text files.73 The Authors began by downloading the ASG for 2012–2016
(the last year for which data was available at the time of this writing).74
The Authors then parsed the ASCII file into a long-form data frame for
ease of use.75 Next, they adjusted dollar expenditures by inflation for each
year to make them comparable.76 The Authors did not adjust expenditures
by cost-of-living indexes. They then averaged the numbers across all
years. This prevents this Article from making longitudinal claims but
reduces the risk that outlier years overpower the analysis.
The Authors followed a similar approach with the second source of
data: the Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll (ASPEP). It
“provides state and local government data on full-time and part-time
employment, part-time hours worked, full-time equivalent employment,
and payroll statistics by governmental function.”77 The Authors focused
on the government functions encapsulated by “police protection” and
“correction.” ASPEP follows a similar data-acquisition approach as the
finances/technical-documentation/questionnaires/historical-forms/2018/f29_2018_blank.pdf?#
[https://perma.cc/P8GC-B4ZQ] (worksheet F-29); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES: SPECIAL AGENCIES 1
(2018), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documentation/
questionnaires/historical-forms/2018/f32_2018_blank.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSE3-X83G]
(worksheet F-32).
71. See 2016 State and Local Total Quantity Response Rates by State for Expenditure,
Revenue, Debt, Asset, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/govfinances/technical-documentation/methodology/2016/statenlocaltqrr16.xlsx [https://perma.cc/
CMR5-62Y2] (reporting nationwide response rates beyond 95%).
72. See, e.g., Ronald C. Fisher & Leslie E. Papke, Local Government Responses to
Education Grants, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 153, 154 (2000); Angela K. Gore, The Effects of GAAP
Regulation and Bond Market Interaction on Local Government Disclosure, 23 J. ACCT. & PUB.
POL’Y 23, 24 (2004); Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of
Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 790 (1998).
73. See Instructions for Saving/Using ASCIII Files, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 15, 1999),
https://www.census.gov/econ/www/instrasci.html [https://perma.cc/JXZ4-GKBN].
74. Other researchers might decide to include more years, but the Authors decided against
including years beyond the last full survey of government units (in 2012) to keep the findings
more closely tethered to current conditions.
75. The Census Bureau bundles the technical documentation necessary for parsing the
ASCII file with the data for each year. See About the Annual Survey of Local Government
Finances, supra note 64.
76. The Authors used the official Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation numbers. Others are
comparable for this Article’s purposes.
77. See Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll (ASPEP): About, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/about.html [https://perma.cc/JY2LJ3A7] (last updated June 5, 2019).
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ASG.78 Response rates are similarly good.79 ASPEP follows its own
sampling strategy.80
There are a couple of points to stress about this data. These datasets
represent a significant trade-off in favor of scale over nuance. The
strength of these data sources is that they are national in scale and, as
such, present a broad portrait of police funding across the entire United
States. This allows this Article to make broad geographic comparisons,
bringing into dialogue police activities from diverse corners of the
country. But this choice for a broad scope entails that the data is not
detailed or attentive to local quirks and complexities.81 The Authors
intend to identify broad themes on a national scale to inform future
research that explores, refines, and challenges these findings in more
circumscribed and detailed settings.
Additionally, much of the data relies on survey responses by
government officials. There is no reason to believe that they would lie or
misrepresent when answering the survey. But, like all survey
respondents, they might misunderstand instructions, misremember facts,
or fill out surveys erroneously.82
With these limitations in mind, this Article turns to its approach. It is
fundamentally descriptive, rather than causal, in nature. The aim is to
inform a normative debate with a broad national account of the state of
police funding. This Article aims to make points at the most granular unit
of analysis. Often, that is at the level of individual law enforcement

78. There are, however, some deviations. For example, no ASPEP was collected in 1996.
See Data: 1996 State & Local Government Datasets, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/1996/econ/apes/annual-apes.html [https://perma.cc/2C4FFBJP].
79. See Response Rates for the 2018 Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/technical-documentation/
user-notes/2018_rr_notice.pdf?# [https://perma.cc/9NNL-C9RV].
80. See, e.g., 2018 Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll Methodology, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/technical-documentation/
methodology/18_methodology.pdf?# [https://perma.cc/3CXW-NTD3].
81. For example, no doubt this Article’s data is inattentive to special informal governing
arrangements in various counties that might mitigate or amplify the trends that this Article
identifies. This analysis does not and cannot capture such detail.
82. There are suggestions in the data that this indeed happened. A few responses are simply
not credible. Sometimes predictably so, with the answers often ten times what comparable
jurisdictions reported, suggesting that perhaps an errand zero entered the survey form somewhere
along the way. As the notes to the figures below indicate, the Authors removed such observations
entirely from the analysis rather than correcting them manually. The Authors have no reason to
believe that such removals undermine the results. On the contrary, when running the analysis
without removing errand observations, the findings tend to be more striking.
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agencies. However, sometimes data limitations do not allow observations
at such a granular level.83
This presents its own methodological challenges.84 To account for
these challenges, all funding within a given county was aggregated. This
approach obscures and minimizes this Article’s main point (inequality
between departments), but the alternatives would present a misleading
picture, unduly penalizing areas of the country where county sheriffs
carry fewer responsibilities than elsewhere. Similarly, there are law
enforcement agencies that span multiple counties (for example, New
York City Police Department patrol precincts are located in five
counties).85 State law enforcement agencies, similarly, are active in
multiple counties.86 To account for such departments, the Authors
disaggregated their funding by population to the counties and county
equivalents. This method also introduces ambiguity into the analysis but,
again, was better than alternatives that would have ignored state police
activities and multicounty law enforcement agencies. The Authors’
guiding principal was to approximate, as well as possible, the typical
policing funding in different parts of the country, keeping always in mind
that the experience within a county in turn often varies widely.
The maps that the Authors created reflect county-level data. The
Authors could have drawn national maps of cities, towns, and townships,
but they are unwieldy and uninformative because there are many
subcounty jurisdictions and because many of them are vanishingly small.
County-level maps, though they must be read with care, are better tools
to show broad geographic trends in the data.87
83. For example, the Washington Post database (which Part II relies on) does not
distinguish between different agencies and allows the Authors only to identify the counties where
fatal incidents occurred. See infra Section II.B. As such, the Authors often had to switch to a
county-level analysis.
84. In some counties there is only one law enforcement agency. See Bradbury, supra note
41. In other counties, a county sheriff works next to multiple city police departments, harbor
police, campus law enforcement, etc. See id. For all county-level analyses, the Authors had to
consider the funding and expenditures of all of these departments while recognizing that, in some
parts of the nation, sheriffs do the brunt of policing (even when there are city police departments)
and, in others, sheriffs are less central to overall law enforcement efforts.
85. See Borough and Precinct Crime Statistics, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.
nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/borough-and-precinct-crime-stats.page [https://perma.cc/
H4XB-ZHXU].
86. See Bradbury, supra note 41.
87. The Authors chose the Albers equal-area conic projection for the maps because it keeps
distortions to a minimal for lower forty-eight United States latitudes. See Albers Equal Area
Conic, ESRI, https://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/latest/map/projections/albers-equal-areaconic.htm [https://perma.cc/FWH5-NFQR]. One important note on reading these maps (like many
maps) is to keep in mind the difference between geographic area and normative importance.
Ultimately, this Article is interested in humans, not plots of land. Maps can obscure that simple
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B. Police Salaries
The descriptive work begins with a national map of average salaries
for full-time equivalent positions.88 The map is calibrated to make
disparities visible. Counties that feature salaries close to the national
average are colored in grey. Counties that pay salaries higher than the
national average are colored in increasingly darker shades of turquoise.
Counties with salaries below the national average are colored in
increasingly darker shades of orange. Counties where data was not
available or insufficient are colored in white.
Figure 1: Average Pay per Full-time Position Equivalent

Figure 1 shows significant regional variation. Southern states and
adjacent regions tend to have significantly lower average salaries for
police officers than many areas in the northeast, the Great Lakes region,
southern Florida, and the Pacific region. Beyond regional variation there
is also notable intraregional variation. Islands of high-salary counties are
surrounded by seas of low-salary areas (for example, around Oklahoma
City). Conversely, there are a few low-salary counties near contrasting
counties.
point and sometimes lead readers to equate size with importance. Despite this danger, this Article
uses maps because the Authors believe that geography is information rich and can show in an
intuitive and easily readable manner connections and discontinuities. Maps, properly approached,
are information rich and comprehensible in ways that tables and matrixes typically are not.
88. Later figures explore the role of part-time work more thoroughly. See infra Figures 3 &
4.
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As discussed more in Part II, these salary differentials may have
serious consequences for the likelihood of officer misconduct. Salary
differentials are likely a rough approximation of the ability of different
counties to attract talent, retain talent, and implement disciplinary
deterrents. For example, when one officer, who was paid approximately
$10 an hour, “accidentally shot an innocent 13-year-old in the back,”89
the local sheriff did not appear to conduct a serious investigation and
ultimately chose not to terminate the officer.90 When asked about the
incident, the sheriff remarked that, “[T]hey have a hard enough time
getting officers to patrol the town, let alone to have a separate part of their
office set aside that just analyzes police-involved shootings.”91
Beyond salaries, this Article also examines police expenditures as a
proxy for a multitude of normatively relevant questions. Expenditures, of
course, vary drastically between counties. To make them more
comparable, this Article measures per capita expenditures on police
salaries. This helps determine whether some of the high-salary counties
of Section A traded higher salaries for fewer officers or, conversely,
whether lower-salary counties compensated by hiring many more
officers. Per capita salary expenditures can thus be understood as a rough
proxy for a measure of police protection that combines quantity and
quality.
Figure 2: Police Expenditures per Capita

89. Patrick Smith, What Happens When Suburban Police Departments Don’t Have Enough
Money?, NPR (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/579778555/what-happens-whensuburban-police-departments-dont-have-enough-money [https://perma.cc/DN3U-HYNS].
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Much like Figure 1, Figure 2 also exhibits marked regionalism.
Numerous southern, Appalachian, Northern Plains, and noncoastal
northeastern counties fall far below the national average. Residents in
other counties enjoy far higher per capita expenditures.
C. Part-Time Officers
Differences in the funding available to individual police departments
also manifest themselves in the employment of full-time and part-time
police officers.92 Law enforcement agencies might hire part-time officers
to minimize the need to pay benefits and provide job security.93 The
potential dangers of such costs savings are significant because part-time
officers may not be as well situated to keep up with the stressful and
demanding requirements of police work as well-paid full-time officers.94
As one police chief remarked:
Oftentimes we have a part-timer, they get with other
departments, and they work as many as three or four
departments . . . . It just beats them up—it really does.
You’ve got to be really careful that you don’t get the tail end
of a double or a triple shift, because then you don’t have
them at 100 percent.95
Almost every county uses some part-time officers.96 But again, as
Figure 3 illustrates, the national variation is significant. Figure 3 shows
the percentage in each county of the overall law enforcement payroll that
goes towards paying for part-time payroll.97

92. Other parts of this Article use full-time equivalents in their analyses. See supra Figure
1. For example, elsewhere the Authors count two half-time officers as the equivalent of one fulltime officer for purposes of calculating “average” salaries (because otherwise comparisons
between part-time and full-time salaries might be misleading). See infra Figures 5, 6 & 7.
However, in this Section, the Authors want to shed light on the reliance of some departments on
part-time officers.
93. Eli Hager, Policing is Not a Part-Time Job, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/22/policing-is-not-a-part-time-job [https://perma.cc
/DU8W-253P].
94. Id.
95. Bradbury, supra note 41.
96. See, e.g., Emily Balser, At Police Departments, Part-Time Officers Stretched Thin,
AP NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/c8cedc50b39248d8ac5e23041d93d0c3
[https://perma.cc/PZ6P-SYUW].
97. Other measures could be used here, such as the percentage of part-time positions.
However, because part-time positions vary tremendously (for example, from 10% positions to
90% positions), the Authors thought the chosen measurement was the clearest, least misleading,
and most broadly applicable. See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Payroll for Part-Time Positions

Figure 3 continues the theme of regional variation but of a different
kind: there are clearly some parts of the country where part-time work is
rare. In other parts of the country, part-time work is more common.
However, the pattern in those parts of the country is spotty. For example,
driving across the Great Plains one might continuously toggle between
counties that significantly rely on part-time work and those that do not.
Such a pattern suggests that decisions about relying on part-time work is
driven by intensely local, rather than regional, factors.
Figure 4 examines this question further. It departs from geography
(where this Article illustrated one variable at a time) to show a
relationship between the two variables of the previous two figures: the
percentage of overall payroll used for part-time officers (vertical axis)
and the average full-time equivalent annual salary (horizontal axis). Each
dot represents one law enforcement agency. Dots are sized by the
population that they serve. A blue smoothed conditional mean line
illustrates the relationship between these variables.98

98. Please note, again, that this Article is not making causal claims here for many reasons,
among them the absence of control variables.
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of Percentage of Part-Time Officers to
Police Compensation

Predictably, Figure 4 suggests that the agencies that have the lowest
average salaries are also the ones that rely most heavily on part-time
officers (the converse is suggestive as well: agencies that rely on parttime officers tend to pay them the least). Part-time work in the world of
law enforcement is, it seems, as lowly paid as in many other sectors of
the economy.99
Overall, it would likely be an oversimplification to say that the United
States currently overinvests in police services. In many large and wellresourced police departments, that might be true. But as the descriptive
data presented above suggests, in many counties across the country the
available tax dollars are so limited that communities can only afford to
hire part-time police officers that receive wages far lower than their peers
in nearby counties—and lower than many other industries.100 This
matters for a couple of reasons.
99. Undoubtedly, many exceptions exist. The point here simply is to make visible broad
national trends.
100. See supra Figure 4.
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First, this is significant because there is evidence that police
departments across the country are currently struggling to attract entrylevel applicants.101 The increasingly tight market for police officers
means that communities unwilling to invest sufficient resources into
officer salaries, benefits, and high-quality working conditions will likely
lose out on the limited pool of available talent to other industries.102 In
cities across the country, applications for open policing jobs have also
declined. For example, job applications in Nashville declined from 4,700
in 2010 to 1,900 in 2017.103 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
saw applications decline from 21,000 applicants per year to only 13,000
in 2017.104 In total, nearly 66% of police departments recently surveyed
by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) reported a decline in
applicants.105 While some have argued that the increased scrutiny of
police officers after Ferguson has contributed to a lack of interest in entrylevel policing jobs,106 others have argued that the strong economy in
recent years has meant that police departments cannot compete with
wages offered by the private industry.107 And police departments have
had a particularly difficult time attracting minority officers.108
Additionally, police departments have also struggled to retain officers in
the profession.109 The PERF survey found that 29% of individuals who
left their policing jobs voluntarily did so after being on the force for less
than one year.110 Another 40% did so after being on the job for less than
five years.111

101. Police Departments Struggle to Recruit Enough Officers, ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/01/05/police-departments-struggle-to-recruitenough-officers [https://perma.cc/V45L-WVDC].
102. Tom Jackman, Who Wants to be a Police Officer? Job Applications Plummet at Most
U.S. Departments, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
crime-law/2018/12/04/who-wants-be-police-officer-job-applications-plummet-most-us-departments
[https://perma.cc/WY2N-FEJ6].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Simone Weichselbaum & Wendi C. Thomas, Is the Answer to Crime More Cops?,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/02/
13/is-the-answer-to-crime-more-cops [https://perma.cc/V7BY-76X6] (“[I]t has become routine
for national police leaders to complain that the politics of Black Lives Matter and viral videos of
police killing civilians, along with low pay, have made it harder to recruit and retain qualified
officers.”).
107. Jackman, supra note 102.
108. Id. (“Making departments more welcoming to minorities and women, in part by
providing them with mentors and physical training, has enabled Tempe, Ariz., to maintain its
recruitment numbers . . . .”).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Second, policing is an industry that exists within a market like any
other. And like other industries, if one employer chooses to
undercompensate its employees (in terms of salary, benefits, or working
conditions), that employer will likely lose many of its employees to
nearby competitors. In the world of policing, officers often have options
to work at many different police agencies. As the data above indicates,
there is widespread inequality in the resourcing of local police
departments. Police departments only miles apart often pay drastically
different wages and offer drastically different working conditions for
their employees. And particularly at a time when departments are
struggling to fill vacancies, police officers have a choice of where they
want to work. A single metropolitan area typically has dozens or even
hundreds of different law enforcement agencies. If one police department
undercompensates its officers relative to its nearby agencies (as appears
to be the case in many places in the United States today), it will likely
struggle to retain the top talent—and instead it may be forced to accept
officers that could not qualify for jobs at higher-paying agencies.
This only scratches the surface of the consequences of inadequate and
unequal funding of police departments. The next Part considers more
thoroughly the implications of these descriptive findings for the delivery
of policing services in the United States.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH INADEQUATE AND UNEQUAL FUNDING
There are significant disparities in the funding of police departments
across the country. Police budgets are almost always tied to local
municipal budgets.112 And because communities tend to rely largely on
local property and sales taxes to fund their police departments, vast
differences in police funding is “not the exception” but instead the
“rule.”113 As one study previous argued, “police departments across the
country vary tremendously in size, operating budget, officer pay, training
requirements, patrol methods, equipment, and on-the-ground
strategies.”114
Low funding and widespread inequality are not without consequence.
This Part considers some of the possible consequences of underfunding
local police departments. By underfunding local police departments (in
absolute terms), communities may impair the ability of the police to
control crime. They can frustrate efforts to adequately monitor and
control officer misconduct. They may incentivize police departments to
seek additional revenue through potentially harmful means like excessive
ticketing or civil asset forfeitures. They encourage agencies to reduce
112. STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION
(2017).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 37–38 (footnotes omitted).
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officer pay, which may ultimately increase the likelihood that police
departments hire and retain unqualified or even dangerous applicants.
And underfunding the public police may simply shift the delivery of
public-safety services to the private industry.
Additionally, the widespread police funding disparities that exist in
the United States raise serious moral, policy, and distributional issues
and, as this Article argues, fail to recognize policing as a fundamental
public good. Combined, this suggests that defunding the police may
ultimately exacerbate many of the problems that it seeks to fix.
A. Crime Rates
First, there is an emerging body of research to suggest that police
officers can influence crime rates. Thus, to the extent that underfunding
of police departments contributes to fewer officers on the streets,
communities that fail to provide adequate resources to their local police
departments may inadvertently contribute to higher crime rates.115 For
many decades, social scientists were skeptical that police could actually
influence crime rates. For example, one literature review by Professor
Samuel Cameron over thirty years ago found that eighteen of twenty-two
prominent studies up to that point failed to find any evidence that police
could reduce crime.116 However, many of these findings may have been
because of the methodological limitations of cross-sectional studies that
often suffered from endogeneity problems. That is, police departments
were more likely to hire additional officers if their communities struggled
with higher crime rates.117 Under these conditions, it often proved
methodologically challenging to disentangle the effect of police-officer
staffing on subsequent crime rates from the effects of other demographic
and social variables that influence both crime and police-officer staffing
rates.118 Even early quasi-experimental models failed to find any
evidence that police could reduce crime in any statistically significant
way. Perhaps most prominently, Professor George Kelling et al. varied
the number of police officers assigned to fifteen different patrol beats in

115. Id. at 37.
116. Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 309 (1988).
117. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of
Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 270–71 (1997) (“Higher crime rates are likely to
increase the marginal productivity of police. Cities with high crime rates, therefore, may tend to
have larger police forces, even if police reduce crime. Detroit has twice as many police officers
per capita as Omaha, and a violent crime rate over four times as high, but it would be a mistake
to attribute the differences in crime rates to the presence of the police.”).
118. Id. at 271.
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Kansas City, Missouri.119 To the surprise of many policing experts,120
Kelling et al. found that the number of officers assigned to a beat patrol
did not affect crime rates in any statistically significant way.121
In recent decades, though, an emerging and growing body of literature
has found that police officers—particularly officers empowered with
effective policing strategies—can likely have a statistically significant
effect on crime rates. First, a handful of studies have found that police
staffing rates likely have an impact on overall crime rates, particularly
violent crime rates. For example, in 1997 Professor Steven Levitt used
the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as a proxy for police
staffing to argue that police staffing causally affects crime rates.122 While
some scholars have taken issue with Levitt’s methodology,123 subsequent
studies have generally found that increases in police staffing likely do
decrease crime rates.124 Second, a robust body of research suggests that
specific policing strategies designed to disrupt situational incentives of
119. GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A
SUMMARY REPORT 2 (1974).
120. See, e.g., GREGORY F. TREVERTON ET AL., MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE OF POLICING
23 (2011).
121. KELLING ET AL., supra note 119.
122. Levitt, supra note 117, at 279.
123. Justin McCrary, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police
on Crime: Comment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1236, 1236–37 (2002) (calling into question some of
Levitt’s 1997 findings).
124. For example, Professors Aaron Chaflin and Justin McCrary used error-corrected
estimates of police elasticity to argue that police can influence crime rates and to claim that the
United States currently employs a suboptimal number of police officers. Aaron Chalfin & Justin
McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167, 167
(2018). Chalfin and McCrary also provide a detailed literature review on this topic, concluding:
A large literature has used city- or state-level panel data and, recently, a
variety of quasi-experimental designs to estimate the elasticity of crime with
respect to manpower. . . .
The early panel-data literature tended to report small elasticity estimates
that were rarely distinguishable from zero and sometimes even positive,
suggesting perversely that police increase crime. . . .
....
[But] Levitt (1997) has given rise to a series of related papers that seek to
identify a national effect of police manpower on crime by isolating
conditionally exogenous within-city variation in police staffing
levels. . . . These strategies consistently demonstrate that police do reduce
crime. . . . [T]he pattern of the cross-crime elasticities [is characterized]
as . . . favoring a larger effect of police on violent crimes than on property
crimes, with especially large effects of police on murder, robbery, and motor
vehicle theft.
Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 5, 13–14 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
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would-be criminals can actually reduce, rather than merely displace,
crime. For example, one meta-analysis conducted by Professor Anthony
Braga et al. in 2014 found that hot-spot policing strategies likely produce
small but statistically significant reductions in certain crime rates, while
the use of problem-oriented policing strategies contributes to even larger
decreases in crime.125 And third, some studies have found that regulation
of police may inadvertently impair their ability to use crime-fighting
strategies, thereby increasing crime.126
Overall, the existing literature suggests that both police staffing and
police strategies can influence crime rates. To the extent that
underfunding or defunding police departments reduces officer staffing
rates or prevents departments from effectively employing crime-fighting
strategies, this lack of funding may lead to more crime. And increased
crime rates generally do not affect all neighborhoods equally. Residents
of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, which are often
disproportionately black and Latinx, frequently bear the brunt of crime.
For example, as Professor Franklin Zimring has previously observed,
when New York City experienced its highest crime rates in the early
1990s, black and Latinx neighborhoods experienced the brunt of this
crime epidemic.127 Conversely, when crime dropped dramatically
through 1990s and early 2000s, victimization among the black and Latinx
communities dropped more significantly than victimization among other
racial groups.128
To be clear, policing is not just about crime control. As countless
scholars have previously written, misconduct by police officers

125. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634–35 (2014).
126. See, e.g., RICHARD ROSENFELD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, WAS THERE A “FERGUSON
EFFECT” ON CRIME IN ST. LOUIS? 1–3 (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/09/Ferguson-Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LFL-MV6Q]; Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1998) (linking Miranda to a decrease in police
clearance rates); David C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large
U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2016) (“[D]isaggregated analyses revealed that robbery rates,
declining before Ferguson, increased in the months after Ferguson.”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin
Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 768 (2017) (finding that efforts by the DOJ to
regulate police departments may inadvertently contribute to a temporary uptick in certain crime
rates, as police officers adjust to new oversight, training, and disciplinary norms); Lan Shi, The
Limit of Oversight in Policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincinnati Riot, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 111
(2009) (finding that arrests fell substantially in the wake of the Cincinnati riots, with the largest
effect apparent for crimes where police had significant discretion).
127. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR
URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 34 (2012).
128. Id. at 42.
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disproportionately affects communities of color,129 eroding public trust
and contributing to civilian injuries, deaths, and serious dignitary harms.
Nevertheless, any discussion of policing and police funding must
confront the growing body of literature on the relationship between
policing and crime control. Reducing the number of police officers on the
streets may create fewer opportunities for officers to engage in
professional misconduct that disproportionately affects racial minorities.
After all, without officers on the street, there will not be any officers to
commit acts of misconduct. But by taking such a step, communities must
be prepared to accept the risk of increased crime disproportionately
affecting racial minorities.
B. Police Violence, Officer Misconduct, and Officer Injuries
Underfunded police departments may also be at a heightened risk of
engaging in professional misconduct, including the use of unjustified
force against civilians. Because of this heightened risk of violent
encounters with civilians, underfunded officers may face higher risks to
their own personal safety.
Perhaps nothing better illustrates the relationship between funding and
officer misconduct than the series of investigative reports issued by the
DOJ pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. This statute gives
the DOJ the power to investigate and seek equitable relief against police
departments engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional
misconduct.130 While the enforcement of this statute has varied over
time,131 the DOJ has used this measure to investigate over sixty police
departments across the country since the statute’s passage in 1994.132 One
analysis conducted by Sarah Childress of PBS Frontline found that the
129. See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon et al., The Influence of Race in Police-Civilian Interactions:
A Content Analysis of Videotaped Interactions Taken During Cincinnati Police Traffic Stops, 58
J. COMM. 530, 544 (2008).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority . . .
to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”); id. § 14141(b)
(“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that [there is a pattern or
practice of misconduct], the Attorney General . . . may in a civil action obtain appropriate
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”).
131. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189,
3228–35 (2014) (showing how enforcement of § 14141 has varied by presidential administration).
132. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 126, at 777–78 (showing a full list of DOJ investigations
and negotiated settlements pursuant to § 14141); see also Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police
Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 793, 794 (2016) (describing how during the Obama Administration alone the DOJ
opened thirty-six investigations and reached approximately twenty-one agreements under §
14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 1343, 1367–72 (2015) (providing additional context about how the DOJ selects cases for
§ 14141 inquiries and the process that follows).
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DOJ observed allegations of officers regularly using excessive force in
70% of these cases; discriminatory policing in 55% of these cases; and
unlawful searches or seizures in 42% of these cases. 133 In response to
these findings, the DOJ has commonly recommended that agencies
improve training, implement computerized risk-assessment systems to
identify officers engaged in patterns of misconduct, reform internal
investigation and disciplinary procedures, and implement a wide range of
other policy and procedure changes.134 Virtually all of these reforms have
one thing in common: they cost a substantial amount of money to
implement. Previous estimates have placed the cost of federal consent
decrees in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on
the size of the police department and the complexity of the agreement.135
Take Cleveland, Ohio, as an example. The DOJ opened an
investigation into the Cleveland Police Department after allegations of
excessive force and discriminatory policing that surfaced between 2011
and 2013.136 The public outcry began after a series of articles in the
Cleveland Plain Dealer suggested that a relatively small group of officers
were involved in a disproportionate number of the alleged excessive force
cases yet were not adequately disciplined.137 Public calls for reform
intensified in 2012 after thirteen police officers fired 137 shots at two
unarmed black individuals in a middle-school parking lot.138 Then, during
133. Sarah Childress, Fixing the Force, PBS: FRONTLINE (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/fixing-the-force/
[https://perma.cc/S9LY-3FLL]
(calculating these percentages using the numbers provided in the interactive figure, which was
last visited in November of 2019).
134. See Rushin, supra note 132, at 1378–87 (describing common elements of negotiated
settlements between the DOJ and local police departments).
135. See id. at 1393 (using Los Angeles as an example of a city where the total price tag of
implementing a federal consent decree likely “surpassed $100 million” because of the cost of
external monitoring, capital investments, staff, training, and more).
136. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 7–9
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/
cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CKM-53GF] (describing
the background that led to the investigation of the Cleveland Police Department and explicitly
mentioning “serious allegations that CDP officers use excessive force, and that the Division fails
to identify, correct, and hold officers accountable for using force in violation of the Constitution”).
137. See, e.g., Henry J. Gomez & Gabriel Baird, 6 Cleveland Officers Accused of Brutality
Have Used Force on 39 Suspects Since 2009, CLEVELAND.COM (May 22, 2011),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/05/cleveland_police_officers_accu.html [https://perma.cc/
RUT8-LTUC]; Henry J. Gomez & Gabriel Baird, 2 Cleveland Police Officers Charged with
Assault are Among Department’s Most Prolific Users of Force, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 27, 2011),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/03/cleveland_police_officers_kevi.html
[https://perma.cc/C48W-NPGG].
138. See Kimbriell Kelly & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Officer Acquitted in Killing of
Unarmed Pair Amid Barrage of Gunfire, WASH. POST (May 23, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/investigations/cleveland-police-officer-found-not-guilty-in-fatal-shooting-of-two-
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the process of this DOJ investigation, Cleveland police officer Timothy
Loehmann shot and killed a twelve-year-old boy named Tamir Rice while
he played with a toy gun in a public park.139 Subsequent investigations
into the incident found that Loehmann had previously been deemed
emotionally unstable and unfit for duty when he worked on the police
force of the nearby Cleveland suburb of Independence, Ohio.140 While
the incident resulted in no criminal charges, the city ultimately agreed to
pay Rice’s family a settlement of $6 million.141
Only weeks after the Rice shooting, the DOJ issued its finding letter,
concluding that the Cleveland police were engaged in patterns of
excessive and unnecessary use of deadly force.142 It found that officers
also used tasers and pepper spray unnecessarily or even in retaliation.143
And it found that officers frequently used excessive force against
individuals suffering from mental illness.144 In May 2015, the DOJ
entered into a consent decree with the City of Cleveland to fix these
patterns of violations.145 The agreement required the appointment of an
people/2015/05/23/280844f0-f028-11e4-a55f-38924fca94f9_story.html [https://perma.cc/CDZ6VVCE] (providing a detailed breakdown of the events leading to the officer’s trial and the ultimate
verdict).
139. See Jane Morice, Appeal Filed on Behalf of Cleveland Police Union to Overturn Firing
of Timothy Loehmann, Ex-Cleveland Cop Who Fatally Shot Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND.COM
(Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/crime/2019/03/appeal-filed-on-behalf-of-clevelandpolice-union-to-overturn-firing-of-timothy-loehmann-ex-cleveland-cop-who-fatally-shot-tamirrice.html [https://perma.cc/2S95-2JES] (“Loehmann shot 12-year-old Tamir less than three
seconds after arriving at the Cudell Recreation Center in November 2014.”).
140. Adam Ferrise, Cleveland Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Had ‘Dismal’ Handgun
Performance for Independence Police, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.cleveland
.com/metro/2014/12/cleveland_police_officer_who_s.html [https://perma.cc/7SHT-SV5Y]; see
also Christine Mai-Duc, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Had Been Deemed Unfit for
Duty, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nncleveland-tamir-rice-timothy-loehmann-20141203-story.html [https://perma.cc/55KD-9YPF]
(“Supervisors described [Loehmann as] an emotionally unstable recruit with a ‘lack of maturity’
and ‘inability to perform basic functions as instructed’ during a weapons training exercise.”). Yet,
even after leaving the Cleveland Police Department, Loehmann was briefly hired by another
agency in Ohio. Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Hired by Rural Police Force, CBS NEWS (Oct. 6,
2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timothy-loehmann-police-officer-who-killedtamir-rice-hired-bellaire-ohio [https://perma.cc/N95K-J8EW].
141. Lauren Hodges, Cleveland to Pay $6 Million to Settle Tamir Rice Lawsuit, NPR
(Apr. 25, 2016, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/25/475583746/
cleveland-to-pay-6-million-to-settle-tamir-rice-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/AZ5L-ZRMH].
142. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 1–4.
143. Id. at 3 (including in the list of ways that Cleveland police were engaged in a pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct: “[t]he unnecessary, excessive or retaliatory use of less lethal force
including tasers, chemical spray and fists”).
144. Id.
145. See Joint Motion and Memorandum for Entry of Consent Decree at 1, United States v.
City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046 (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015); Settlement Agreement at 2–3,
City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046.
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external monitor, paid by Cleveland taxpayers, to oversee the police
department.146 It required new training protocols for officers.147 It
mandated additional paperwork and regulations of the civil complaint
process.148 It required the hiring of new staff to collect and analyze data
on officer behavior.149 It required the hiring of a new police inspector
general to oversee the protection of civil rights by the police
department.150 It required the hiring of a crisis-intervention coordinator151
and a training coordinator.152 And it required upgrades to computer
technology to better track officer behavior over time.153 In the DOJ’s
opinion, these kinds of investments were necessary to correct the pattern
of unconstitutional misconduct present in the agency. But these reforms
would not come cheap. As Rich Exner from the Cleveland Plain Dealer
concluded, these regulations could likely cost Cleveland taxpayers up to
$55 million over a five-year period.154
While costly, emerging empirical evidence suggests that these
reforms likely contribute to measurable decreases in rates of officer
misconduct. For example, a careful study by Professors Zachary A.
Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl, and John L. Worrall found that federal
consent decrees were “associated with modest reductions in the risk of
[federal] civil rights” lawsuits for officer misconduct.155 Other empirical
examinations of § 14141 consent decrees have found that they contribute
to reductions in officer use of force,156 increases in civilian satisfaction
146. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 145, at 80–92 (outlining the selection and
appointment of an external monitor and their responsibilities).
147. See id. at 19–20, 35–36, 63–67 (describing various types of training required for officers
going forward).
148. See id. at 43–54 (describing how the Cleveland police should document and handle
civilian complaints).
149. Id. at 93 (requiring the hiring of new personnel as necessary for the implementation of
the agreement).
150. Id. at 58.
151. Id. at 35.
152. Id. at 65.
153. See id. at 76–77 (explaining how the Cleveland police must develop an officerintervention program that includes a computerized relational database to collect and review data
on officer behavior, including uses of force, taser discharges, injuries or deaths to persons in
custody, civilian complaints, failures to initiate recordings via body cameras, negative credibility
assessments, disciplinary action, corrective action, and more).
154. Rich Exner, How Much Cleveland Will Pay to Reform Its Police Department Under
Consent Decree, CLEVELAND.COM (June 2, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/
2015/06/how_much_it_will_cost_clevelan.html. [https://perma.cc/PR6F-UXXM].
155. Zachary A. Powell et al., Police Consent Decrees and Section 1983 Civil Rights
Litigation, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 575, 577 (2017).
156. See, e.g., Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in
American Police Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 125–26 (2016) (showing that, as an
example, Los Angeles appeared to see somewhat of a decrease in certain types of use of force
during its consent decree).
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with law enforcement,157 and improved processing of civilian
complaints.158 The lesson from § 14141 cases is clear. For many of the
most troubled police departments, the problem comes down to a lack of
financial investment in oversight and accountability mechanisms.
Without investment in proper training, early-intervention systems, and
staff dedicated to accountability, policing organizations can develop
cultures that permit or even promote professional misconduct. These
investments are not cheap. And by defunding or underfunding police
departments in response to patterns of police misconduct, activists risk
exacerbating the very problem that they seek to remedy.
Defunding or a lack of adequate resources may also contribute to
police misconduct in another, less obvious way. The majority of police
officers are part of police unions that negotiate collectively with their
employers about wages, benefits, and other conditions or terms of
employment.159 This generally includes internal disciplinary procedures,
including how supervisors can investigate, suspend, or fire officers
suspected of engaging in professional misconduct.160 Evidence compiled
by Campaign Zero has shown that police union contracts often contain a
range of potentially problematic clauses that can impede legitimate
internal investigations into officer misconduct.161 These police contracts
commonly delay interrogations of officers suspected of misconduct,
require that officers get access to information before any such
157. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S
EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 35, 38 (2002), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
Publications/turning-necessities-into-virtue-pittsburghs-experience-with-a-federal-consentdecree/legacy_downloads/Pittsburgh_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FTC-5FSE] (showing
that a clear majority of respondents thought a consent decree was necessary and that the
department had either stayed the same or improved because of it); CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL.,
POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 44,
68 (2009), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GPX9-DJFJ] (showing a general increase in civilian satisfaction with local law enforcement in
Los Angeles after the initiation of a federal consent decree); GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., POLICECOMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI 89–107 (2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG853.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B7J-3588] (showing an
increase in the community’s perception of police professionalism in Cincinnati).
158. Cf. Rushin, supra note 156, at 116–17, 117 n.30 (noting that the Los Angeles Police
Department was required to improve citizen complaint procedures under § 14141 and describing
the use of sting audits to ensure compliance with complaint procedures).
159. See BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (2010),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC93-NMVQ] (explaining that
roughly two-thirds of police officers are part of departments that authorize collective bargaining).
160. Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 558–61 (2019)
(describing how collective bargaining contributes to internal disciplinary procedures).
161. DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS
ANALYSIS 1 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773
f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/1467217 560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8DS-Z8F7].
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interrogation, purge disciplinary files, mandate the use of arbitration on
appeal, block the consideration of anonymous civilian complaints, and
more.162 Reporting from a number of different cities has found that
jurisdictions are often forced into offering these expansive protections
from disciplinary investigations and punishment, in part because they
cannot afford to meet officer demands for higher salaries and better
benefits.163 And as communities have explored pulling back some of
these protections, they have faced a harsh reality: if they try to do so,
police officer unions will demand higher compensation and better
benefits as a trade-off during negotiations.164
Thus, underfunding or defunding can contribute to police misconduct
by forcing police departments to make up for their inability to offer
competitive wages and benefits by insulating officers from disciplinary
oversight and accountability. This trade-off may temporarily placate
officers and avoid personnel loss, but it comes at a high price. Emerging
empirical evidence suggests that by offering these disciplinary
concessions, police departments may increase the likelihood of violence
against civilians and professional misconduct by officers.165
Anecdotes, like those described above, lead the Authors to
hypothesize about the possible relationship between the two variables—
that is, when police departments fail to properly fund police departments,
the Authors believe it is possible that those officers may engage in more
violent encounters with civilians because of a lack of proper training,
support, equipment, and hiring controls. Clearly, more rigorous empirical
examination is needed. To preliminarily explore the hypothesis that
underfunding may contribute to more officer misconduct and violent
encounters with civilians, the Authors combined the data from Figures 1
through 4 with two additional datasets. First, this Article relies on the
Washington Post “Fatal Force” database of police officer shootings since
162. See id. at 2; see also Abdul Rad, Police Institutions and Abuse: Evidence from the US
41–52 (Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3246419 (categorizing union contracts according to many different variables).
163. John Chase & David Heinzmann, Cops Traded Away Pay for Protection in Police
Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctchicago-police-contracts-fop- 20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/D5SE-93J9].
164. See Tonya Francisco, Police Union Contract Talks Continue, as Do Calls from More
Civilian Oversight, WGN9 (May 21, 2019, 6:12 PM), https://wgntv.com/2018/05/21/policeunion-contract-talks-continue-as-do-calls-from-more-civilian-oversight (stating that local
residents in Chicago have applied pressure to the city to rethink some of the protections given to
Chicago officers in their contracts) [https://perma.cc/5N7F-MY24]; see also Mark Wilson, Austin
Police Union Ready to Re-Enter Contract Negotiations, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 30, 2018,
12:01 AM), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/ 20180130/Austin-police-union-ready-to-reenter-contract-negotiations [https://perma.cc/BCV9-84A9] (describing how demands by local
residents have forced a reconsideration of portions of the local police contract).
165. Rad, supra note 162, at 41–52.
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2015.166 This is one of several important new attempts by the media,
activists, and social scientists to document how often police officers kill
civilians. Other similar databases include “The Counted” database by the
Guardian,167 Mapping Police Violence organized by Campaign Zero,168
Fatal Encounters,169 and Killed by Police.170 The Washington Post
database aims to catalogue every fatal shooting nationwide by a police
officer in the line of duty because data compiled by the federal
government was unreliable and incomplete.171 The Authors chose to rely
on this database because the project won the 2016 Pulitzer Prize for
National Reporting, suggesting a high level of reliability.172 The raw data
is available online.173
The data, while better than anything else available or that could have
been assembled by the Authors, has a significant limitation. This Article
is particularly interested in the geographic location of a fatal-force
incident and the particular law enforcement agency involved. However,
the Washington Post database typically relies on local newspaper reports
to identify locations.174 Such reporting frequently uses colloquial names,
names of specific neighborhoods within larger cities, small and
unincorporated towns and townships, misspelled entries, and reports that
confuse tribal names with cities and counties. This Article supplements
the Washington Post database with the Authors’ research to disambiguate
such entries. Additionally, the Washington Post database identifies
locations of incidents but does not always identify law enforcement
agencies involved in the incidents. For example, it does not identify
whether the officer involved in a fatal shooting was a county sheriff
166. See Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019 [https://perma.cc/8SNX-G8VJ] (providing a
continuously updated tally of killings by police officers in the United States).
167. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database
[https://perma.cc/BP8B-ZRYS].
168. Samuel Sinyangwe, Mapping Police Violence, MAPPINGPOLICEVIOLENCE.ORG,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org [https://perma.cc/XG2S-T5DW] (last updated May 15, 2019).
169. D. Brian Burghart, Fatal Encounters, FATAL ENCOUNTERS (June 28, 2019),
https://fatalencounters.org [https://perma.cc/AVP2-7LL5].
170. Police Shooting Database, KILLED BY POLICE, https://killedbypolice.net
[https://perma.cc/6BTG-T4RQ].
171. Tate et al., supra note 166.
172. The 2016 Pulitzer Prize Winner in National Reporting, PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/washington-post-staff [https://perma.cc/5QHC-72AS].
173. Raw data can be found at Fatal Police Shootings Data, https://raw.githubuser
content.com/washingtonpost/data-police-shootings/master/fatal-police-shootings-data.csv
[https://perma.cc/AT6E-4MFB]. Nevertheless, the database must be treated with caution because
it relies on newspaper reports of fatal incidents (that might in turn be faulty or incomplete) and
tips from newspaper readers. About This Story, GITHUB, https://github.com/washingtonpost/datapolice-shootings [https://perma.cc/S3N9-DLXW].
174. About This Story, supra note 173.
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deputy or a town police officer. As such, all figures in this Article that
rely on the Washington Post database use counties as units of analysis.175
In Figure 5, this Article uses the Washington Post data described in
Part I to graphically illustrate the relationship between the number of
deaths caused by police per 100,000 residents compared to the average
pay for police officers in each county in the United States. For clarity
purposes, it removes extreme outliers and counties where no deaths were
reported. While the blue line represents an approximate trend line
illustrating the general correlation between these two variables, it is
important to emphasize that this graph does not demonstrate a causal
relationship, and police violence against civilians is obviously a crude
measure of officer misconduct or police violence more generally.176 Even
so, Figure 5 provides some initially useful evidence that future social
scientists may want to use to investigate the relationship between police
violence and police funding.

175. Having collected and cleaned these four sources of data, the Authors combined them.
ASG, ASPEP, and Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted data was easily matched by
Census FIPS codes. See American National Standards Institute/Federal Information Processing
Standards (ANSI/FIPS), CENSUS.GOV, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/fips
[https://perma.cc/UN67-XBCF] (providing the definitions for the American National Standards
Institute codes). The Washington Post data only uses names of locations and had to be matched
by script.
176. To elaborate further, the variables that the Authors are most interested in measuring are
difficult and perhaps impossible to obtain. For example, it would be invaluable to have a reliable
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction longitudinal count of how many routine traffic stops descended into
verbal altercations or violence. But instead the Authors have only the crudest count of when
interactions resulted in the death of an officer or civilian. The Authors recognize that such
instances only represent the most dramatic tip of a much larger iceberg with an unknown shape.
It is unclear whether that iceberg is small or big, deep or broad, skewed or even. The Authors
suspect (again, without knowing or having a way to know) that in many cases the instances of
death are a good proxy for dangerous behavior that also takes many other forms. But the Authors
also recognize that such instances of death might be totally unrepresentative of what goes on in a
given community. As such, the Authors caution readers and future researchers to be aware of
where the data is crude and where it is not.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time
Equivalent) and Police Killings of Civilians per 100,000 Residents

Next, this Article analyzes an additional data source to determine
whether underfunding of police may be related to the risk of physical
violence against officers in the line of duty: the FBI’s database on Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA).177 It reports
“information concerning line-of-duty deaths and/or assaults of law
enforcement officers in the United States.”178 The data distinguishes
between accidental and felonious deaths and assaults that resulted in
injuries and those that did not.179 The data is collected from FBI field
offices and “[c]ity, college and university, county, state, tribal, and
177. 2018 Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, FBI: UCR (2018),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2018 [https://perma.cc/5BRM-DF7X].
178. Id. Typically, it has used summary statistics tables of the data that are readily available
online. For the raw data, researchers must either contact the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information
Services Division or utilize another data archive. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Reporting Program Data: Police Employee (LEOKA) Data, United States, 2016, NACJD
(June 29, 2018), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/37062 [https://perma.cc
/YC39-VNED].
179. 2018 Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, supra note 177.
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federal law enforcement agencies participating in the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program.”180 LEOKA has been used widely by courts181 and
academics.182 LEOKA provides an invaluable tool to measure and
geographically pinpoint violence directed at officers.183 However, the
LEOKA data only focuses on assaults and deaths of law enforcement
officers in the line of duty. It makes no attempts to collect related
information for civilians.184
This Article uses the LEOKA data to visually illustrate the
relationship between fatalities of officers in the line of duty in Figure 6.
Again, this Article uses trend lines to illustrate the relationship between
the two variables, which should be understood as illustrating a general
trend and not demonstrating any apparent causation between these two
variables absent more rigorous empirical analysis. This Article also
removes jurisdictions that reported no deaths and jurisdictions that appear
to be extreme outliers. This kind of preliminary analysis suggests that
there may be some type of relationship worthy of further, rigorous
empirical exploration.

180. Methodology: Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 2018, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2018/resource-pages/methodology-officers-accidentally-killed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VK89-JZG5].
181. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24, 24 n.21 (1968) (citing FBI statistics to make
the point that “American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this
country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded”). See generally Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic
Stops, 117 MICH. L. REV. 635, 647 n.55 (2019) (citing cases and remarking that “[s]everal courts
have also referenced or relied on LEOKA statistics in their opinions when discussing the safety
risks that routine traffic stops pose to law enforcement officers”).
182. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Police, Race, and the Production of Capital
Homicides, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 261, 291 n.125 (2018); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin,
From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 263, 302 n.245 (2017); David B. Mustard, The Impact of Gun Laws on Police Deaths, 44
J.L. & ECON. 635, 640, 640 n.25 (2001).
183. The strength of this data is that it originates from close to the source by parties motivated
to report fully. The weakness of this data mirrors the strength: reporting law enforcement agencies
might have skewed views of what to report and might (intentionally or not) overreport to secure
public support or underreport to mask misbehavior.
184. See Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 126
(2016) (“It seems incongruent for the federal government to keep detailed records on the number
of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted in the line of duty, but not keep comparable records
on citizens killed or assaulted by law enforcement.” (footnote omitted)).
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time
Equivalent) and Police Fatalities in the Line of Duty per 100,000
Residents

However, when comparing the number of police injuries that do not
result in fatalities to police funding, the relationship appears to be less
suggestive. Figure 7 plots police injuries against police compensation,
using the same methodology described above.
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Figure 7: Scatterplot of Average Pay (Full-Time and Part-Time
Equivalent) and Police Assaults (with and without injuries) in the
Line of Duty per 100,000 Residents

Overall, the Authors believe that this kind of preliminary analysis,
combined with the anecdotal evidence presented above, makes a strong
case that underfunding of police departments may heighten the risk of
officer misconduct and police violence—but substantially more empirical
research is necessary on this topic to verify these hypotheses.
C. Dangerous Revenue Streams
Underfunding may also increase pressure on law enforcement
agencies to find alternative revenue streams. In this way, underfunding
or defunding police may not actually reduce policing activity but, instead,
simply shift police enforcement to revenue generating law enforcement
actions that raise serious constitutional and public policy concerns. The
DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) is a
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cautionary tale. The DOJ initiated its investigation of the FPD in response
to the public protests of the shooting of Michael Brown in 2014. 185 The
DOJ ultimately released a detailed and scathing report in March of 2015
concluding that the FPD was engaged in a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional misconduct in violation of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.186 While the DOJ ultimately
failed to find evidence that Officer Darren Wilson violated federal law
when he shot Brown, it did uncover significant evidence that when they
faced significant funding issues, FPD leadership and city leaders used the
police department as a source to generate revenue in a manner that
routinely violated residents’ civil rights—particularly black residents.187
For example, the DOJ discovered that back in 2010, the finance
director in Ferguson emailed the police chief to tell him that “[w]e are
looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall” unless “ticket writing ramps
up significantly before the end of the year.”188 In response to the pressure
created by a lack of revenue, the police chief changed officers to a twelvehour shift schedule designed to “increase traffic enforcement per shift.”189
Thereafter, the Ferguson police engaged in “aggressive code
enforcement” that seemed to be largely unrelated to public safety and
often based on questionable understandings of the law.190 Officers would
commonly issue multiple citations for the same violation.191 They would
sometimes issue “six, eight, or, in at least one instance, fourteen citations
for a single encounter.”192 Some officers told the DOJ investigators that
they would compete to see who could issue the most citations in a single
civilian encounter.193 Supervisors posted lists showing the number of
citations issued by each officer, in hopes of motivating officers to write

185. Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/
justice-department-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html [https://perma.cc/WVC3-D466] (“The
shooting was deemed justified, but it galvanized protesters, helped start the Black Lives Matter
movement and brought the attention of the Department of Justice to the city’s police practices.”).
186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, at i
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KN5-LGE7].
187. See id. at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 10 (“Law enforcement experience has shown that this schedule makes community
policing more difficult—a concern that we have also heard directly from FPD officers.
Nonetheless, while FPD heavily considered the revenue implications of the 12-hour shift and
certain other factors such as its impact on overtime and sick time usage, we have found no
evidence that FPD considered the consequences for positive community engagement.”).
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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even more tickets.194 And supervisors used “productivity,” as measured
in part by the number of citations, in making disciplinary and promotion
decisions.195
This use of municipal traffic and code violations to generate revenue
had devastating impacts on many members of the community. As the
report highlighted:
One woman . . . received two parking tickets for a single
violation in 2007 that then totaled $151 plus fees. Over seven
years later, she still owed Ferguson $541—after already
paying $550 in fines and fees, having multiple arrest
warrants issued against her, and being arrested and jailed on
several occasions. . . . A 90-year-old man had a warrant
issued for his arrest after he failed to timely pay the five
citations FPD issued to him during a single traffic stop in
2013. An 83-year-old man had a warrant issued against him
when he failed to timely resolve his Derelict Auto violation.
A 67-year-old woman told us she was stopped and arrested
by a Ferguson police officer for an outstanding warrant for
failure to pay a trash-removal citation. She did not know
about the warrant until her arrest, and the court ultimately
charged her $1,000 in fines, which she continues to pay off
in $100 monthly increments despite being on a limited, fixed
income. We have heard similar stories from dozens of other
individuals and have reviewed court records documenting
many additional instances of similarly harsh penalties, often
for relatively minor violations.196
In the years leading up to the DOJ investigation, these tactics helped
the Ferguson police to overcome budget shortfalls. But in the process, the
police department eroded public trust and seriously disrupted the lives of
hundreds of individuals. Poor black residents in Ferguson also
disproportionately experienced the harm of these revenue-generating
policing tactics. Between 2012 and 2014, black individuals accounted for
90% of the citations issued by the police, despite representing only 67%
of Ferguson’s population.197 And black individuals were far more likely
to be subject to multiple citations in a single encounter. The DOJ
documented seventy-three times when Ferguson police issued four or
194. Id. (“Each month, the municipal court provides FPD supervisors with a list of the
number of tickets issued by each officer and each squad. Supervisors have posted the list inside
the police station, a tactic officers say is meant to push them to write more citations.”).
195. Id. at 11–12. As an example, the report describes how “[i]n April 2010 . . . a patrol
supervisor criticized a sergeant for his squad only issuing 25 tickets in a month, including one
officer who issued ‘a grand total’ of 11 tickets to six people on three days ‘devoted to traffic
stops.’” Id. at 11.
196. Id. at 42.
197. Id. at 4.
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more citations to a black individual in a single incident, but only two
times when a similarly large number of citations were ever issued to a
non-black individual.198 Black individuals were also substantially more
likely to be subject to tickets for highly discretionary offenses and were
more likely to have arrest warrants issued for failure to pay municipal
fines.199
This phenomenon is almost certainly not limited to Ferguson. An
example from New York further illustrates how revenue-generating
policing can lead to officers targeting minority groups. There, a new local
investigation found that numerous officers felt pressured to increase
summons and arrests to illustrate their productivity to supervisors.200 As
one officer candidly explained to the reporter,
[W]hen you go hunting, when you put any type of numbers
on a police officer to perform, we are going to go for the
most vulnerable. Of course, we’re going to go for the LGBT
community, we’re going to the black community, we’re
going to those that have no vote, that have no power.201
Unfortunately, there appears to be no immediately obvious way to test
empirically whether there is a definitive relationship between these two
variables, in part because of the lack of uniform national data on this type
of low-level ticketing and enforcement. Future studies may be able to
examine this question by taking advantage of quasi-experimental
settings, such as where individual jurisdictions or clusters of jurisdictions
experience sudden disinvestment creating unexpected budgetary
constraints on a police department.
D. Disciplinary Shifting
Additionally, a growing body of evidence suggests that inadequate
resources may force underfunded police departments to lower their
standards for employment. This can lead to a phenomenon the Authors
describe as disciplinary shifting—a process by which poorer police
departments that cannot compete with the salaries of other departments
may be forced to hire officers that may be otherwise unemployable by
other departments because of prior misconduct. Some empirical evidence
for this proposition comes from a recent study conducted by Professors
198. Id.
199. Id. at 5.
200. Sarah Wallace, I-Team: More NYPD Officers Say There’s Proof of Quota-Driven
Arrests, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:17 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/
NYPD-Officers-Arrest-Quota-Exclusive-Interview-Pressure-Numbers-374077091.html [https://
perma.cc/64AJ-3K9B].
201. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/3

40

Rushin and Michalski: Police Funding

2020]

POLICE FUNDING

317

Ben Grunwald and John Rappaport.202 They evaluated a dataset of around
77,000 full-time police officers employed by the roughly 500 law
enforcement agencies in Florida.203 They found that, in any given year,
around 4% of all police officers in the state were previously fired from
another agency.204 While these officers appeared to have some trouble
finding employment at another agency, Professors Grunwald and
Rappaport found that these so-called wandering officers sometimes find
future employment at smaller agencies with fewer resources, and in
municipalities with larger communities of color.205 And these wandering
officers pose more serious risks of future misconduct compared to their
peers. An officer who was previously fired by another agency in Florida
is roughly twice as likely to be fired from his next employer for
misconduct than other similarly situated officers.206 Thus, to the extent
that underfunding or defunding a police department reduces the ability of
that department to compete with nearby agencies in compensation or
benefits, this process may ultimately contribute to the agency hiring more
unqualified or wandering officers with histories of professional
misconduct that are likelier to recommit similar offenses.
An example from the Chicago suburb of Dolton, Illinois, illustrates
this challenge. As an NPR investigation revealed, some police
departments in the Chicago suburbs are so cash-strapped that they cannot
pay for officer training, they cannot afford to fully investigate police
shootings, they can only afford to pay police officers the equivalent of
“fast-food wages,” and they cannot afford to fire problem officers.207
When Chief Robert Collins took over as the police chief in Dolton, he
observed that the department had an unusually large number of officerinvolved shootings for a small department serving a community of only
22,000 residents.208 One officer in particular had “killed one man and
wounded three others in separate shootings.”209 Before this officer joined
the Dolton police force, he was suspended by another department for a
similar shooting and fired by another department for professional
misconduct.210 While this background may disqualify him from many
policing jobs, “for cash-strapped suburbs like Dolton, it made him
202. Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2020) (on file with authors).
203. Id. at *6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *31–36 (providing a detailed analysis of how wandering officers more frequently
end up in communities of color and in smaller offices with less resources).
206. Id. at *36–45 (offering a detailed and rigorous empirical analysis of the likelihood of
future apparent misconduct by and disciplinary action against wandering officers).
207. Smith, supra note 89.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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affordable.”211 That is because financially distressed communities with
small policing budgets cannot afford the roughly $140,000 it costs to hire,
train, and compensate a new police officer during his first year on the
job.212 Instead, these underfunded agencies are often forced to pay their
officers far less—some less than an entry-level employee at the local
Walmart—and go without the same level of academy or in-service
training.213
This problem is compounded by the fact that some states, like Illinois,
do not permit the decertification of officers for mere professional
misconduct. Instead, Illinois requires that an officer be convicted of a
felony or one of a handful of misdemeanor offenses before the officer can
be decertified.214 In many other states, mere commission of an act of
professional misconduct, even without a criminal conviction, is sufficient
to trigger decertification.215 As a result, wandering officers in Illinois may
remain police officers, often only employable at agencies that have
insufficient funding to hire more qualified officers. Thus, simply
defunding police departments may have perverse and unintended
consequences. As long as other agencies are offering comparatively
higher wages and better working conditions, defunded police
departments may be unable to hire or keep qualified officers. Instead,
these defunded police departments may be forced to hire individuals
willing to work for such comparatively lower compensation—including
wandering officers that have proven themselves unfit for the
responsibilities of public police work.
E. Private Policing
Another potential impact of defunding local law enforcement is the
shifting of private security forces into the business of public safety.
Again, this shift is unlikely to affect all communities equally. In
numerous cases, when local governments do not adequately invest in
public police, wealthy residents fill this gap by investing in private
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/6.1(a) (2019), amended by H.B. 2591, 101st Gen. Assemb.
(Ill. 2019). For a detailed analysis on decertification, see generally Roger L. Goldman, A Model
Decertification Law, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 147 (2012).
215. See Goldman, supra note 214, at 151; see also Roger L. Goldman, NDI: Tracking
Interstate Movement of Decertified Police Officers, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/ndi-tracking-decertified-police-officers [https://perma.cc/
G5XM-R5NR] (discussing how officers travel between states to avoid one state’s decertification
decision); Candice Norwood, Can States Tackle Police Misconduct with Certification Systems?,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/police-mis
conduct-decertification/522246 [https://perma.cc/7UBV-CQTV] (describing the importance of
certification laws in addressing the broader problem of police misconduct).
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security services. This leaves poorer residents, and often communities of
color, underserved compared to their wealthier counterparts.
Take the example of Oakland, California. Back in 2013, the city was
reeling from a 24% increase in robberies and a 45% increase in armed
robberies.216 But in the wake of the recession, the city was financially
limited in the resources that it could allocate to the police department.217
Oakland ultimately lost around 200 officers, resulting in an understaffed
police force that lacked the manpower to respond to all reports of criminal
activity.218 In response, a number of wealthier communities in Oakland
began investing in private security forces to patrol their neighborhoods.219
This was not the first time that Oakland turned to private security to
supplement an underfunded local police force. Four years earlier, the
Oakland City Council approved the hiring of the private security agency
International Services Inc. to patrol some crime-plagued
neighborhoods.220 While Oakland paid an average of $250,000 annually
to cover the salary and benefits for each public police officer, it could
afford to hire four private security patrolmen for only $200,000 each
year.221 Other cities such as New Orleans have similarly invested in
cheaper private security forces when faced with budget shortfalls.222
This shift from public to private policing in the face of underfunding
comes with several serious drawbacks. First, the move towards private
policing exacerbates inequality. In the above Oakland example, residents
received drastically different public-safety services based in part on their
socioeconomic status. Poorer residents had to rely on an underfunded
police department—one that does not even have the manpower to respond
to many types of criminal offenses—as their primary provider of publicsafety services. Wealthier residents, though, could afford to invest in
216. Richard Gonzales, With Robberies Up, Oakland Residents Turn to Private Cops, NPR
(Nov. 15, 2013, 3:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/11/15/245213687/with-robberies-upoakland-residents-turn-to-private-cops [https://perma.cc/3PC5-S6CD].
217. Id.
218. Id. (“[T]he Oakland Police Department has been hamstrung by the loss of more than
200 officers and can't respond to all the calls it receives for help.”).
219. Will Kane, More in Oakland Relying on Private Security, SFGATE (Sept. 14, 2013, 9:54
PM), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/More-in-Oakland-relying-on-private-security-48153
36.php [https://perma.cc/7E9D-GLFH] (telling the story of “dozens of private security officers
hired by residents across Oakland to supplement—if not replace—a depleted, overwhelmed police
force”).
220. Bobby White, Cash-Strapped Cities Try Private Guards Over Police, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
21, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027127337237011 [https://perma.cc/
JK8X-SGU2].
221. Id.
222. Id. (explaining that New Orleans began permitting “armed private patrols since 1997,
when residents in an east New Orleans community petitioned Louisiana’s Legislature to create a
tax on property owners to pay for” the measure and noting that, at the time of the publication,
around 100 private guards worked in the area).
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private security forces to supplement the underfunded local law
enforcement. Second, the move towards private policing transfers
everyday public-safety services to private security officers that are
generally poorly trained and inadequately regulated compared to their
public counterparts. As one study found, while some classes of private
police commonly take on many of the same everyday policing
responsibilities as public police officers—use of force in self-defense,
detention of suspects, and searches of property—they commonly face
minimal licensing requirements and few regulations.223 Perhaps most
notably, that study found that even states with robust regulations of
private police officers still typically required no more than forty hours of
total training.224
Among all of the hypothesized negative side effects of defunding the
police, this may be the most challenging one to empirically evaluate in
the future given the lack of a cross-jurisdictional database on the
frequency with which each local community relies on private security
forces. Nevertheless, the theory, accompanied by the anecdotal evidence,
is worthy of serious consideration.
III. REIMAGINING POLICE FUNDING
Supporters of defunding or abolishing American police have made
powerful arguments in favor of moving scarce governmental resources
away from the criminal justice system generally, and policing
specifically, and reallocating them towards education and community
development.225 Given the racially imbalanced consequences of police
misconduct and overcriminalization, these calls are compelling.226 But as
this Article has shown, disinvestment from policing also presents some
potential drawbacks that policy makers must seriously consider. In many
jurisdictions, underfunding rather than overfunding of police
departments—particularly the underfunding of officer salaries, training,
oversight mechanisms, and disciplinary systems—likely contribute to
systemic patterns of misconduct. And much of this underfunding is
seemingly the result of the existing inequality across different
geographical spaces. Defunding police, and reallocating these funds to
223. See generally Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV.
159 (2012) (coding state regulations of private police and providing analysis on how private police
regulations differ from public regulations). For more detailed and important evaluations of the
private police in the United States, see generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private
Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the
State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357 (2006); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004).
224. Rushin, supra note 223, at 191 (listing Alaska, California, and Florida as three states
that required a full forty hours of training before licensure of a private police officer).
225. Mock, supra note 32; Invest-Divest, supra note 33.
226. See, e.g., Dixon et al., supra note 129, at 542–43.
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other community initiatives, may be a viable path forward in
communities that currently overinvest in policing services, particularly
those with relatively low crime, a high number of police officers per
capita, and a relatively robust officer-accountability system. However,
the Authors are skeptical that defunding is a viable policy solution for
many police departments in the United States that struggle to pay officers
livable wages and employ limited or no substantial accountability
systems. Defunding or disinvesting from these agencies may exacerbate
patterns of officer misconduct rather than remedy them, for the reasons
discussed in Part II. And in these communities, further disinvesting from
policing may even prevent police from employing policing strategies that
could influence crime rates or improve public safety.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that society must accept the existing
inequality as an inevitability. This Article argues that states can and
should fundamentally reimagine how they fund the police. Rather than
relying primarily on state and local tax dollars to fund local police
departments, states should view policing as a public good that ought to
be equitably distributed across the population according to need. Just as
some state legislatures have passed revenue-sharing initiatives designed
to equalize the availability of public goods such as education, so too
should states act to equalize the funding of local police departments
according to need. While there are many similar laws that this Article
could have focused on in this analysis, the so-called Robin Hood taxrecapture law employed in Texas to ensure equitable funding of local
school districts may serve as a rough blueprint for communities seeking
to reimagine police funding.227 Creating a police funding plan that
mirrors the Texas recapture law would ensure that all localities have
minimally sufficient resources to investigate crime and promote public
safety regardless of the strength of the local tax base. This would also
ensure that economically marginalized communities are not forced to
allocate such a comparatively large portion of their general expenditures
towards policing services relative to other local services. This, in turn,
would likely leave these communities with additional funds to spend on
delivering community services.
Additionally, to ensure the quality of policing services, states should
require that each local police department earmark a specified portion of
its budget for officer training and accountability. This would ensure that
police departments use this new equitable-funding model in a manner that
balances the coercive nature of policing with the need for proper
community oversight of policing tactics. Combined, these regulations of
police funding could ensure that localities have sufficient resources to

227. See infra Section III.A (describing the origins of the Texas recapture law).
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promote the public good without drawing limited resources away from
other community initiatives.
A. Educational Tax-Recapture Programs as a Blueprint for
Police Funding
The Texas Robin Hood tax-recapture law228 for the funding of local
education represents a potential blueprint for this Article’s plan. The
circumstances that led to the passage of this law closely resemble the
current circumstances surrounding the funding of local police
departments. Much as most localities across the country currently fund
their police department through general fund expenditures raised by local
property and sales taxes, Texas similarly relied on this type of funding
strategy to support its school systems before its passage of the recapture
law.229 This reliance on local property taxes, in particular, led to massive
disparities in the amount of resources available to each school district
within Texas. In the years leading up to the Robin Hood law’s enactment,
the wealthiest district in Texas had around $14,000,000 in property
wealth per student, compared to only $20,000 in property wealth per
student in the poorest district in the state.230 And the 300,000 students in
the poorest communities had less than 3% of the state’s property wealth,
compared to the 300,000 students in the wealthiest school districts that
controlled around 25% of the state’s property wealth.231 These disparities
in wealth meant that poorer districts had to levy higher taxes to raise even
a fraction of the same amount of resources as the wealthier school
districts.232 For example, the poorest 100 districts had to tax property at
an average of $0.745 per $100 of valuation just to raise around $2,978
per student, while the wealthiest 100 districts had to levy taxes of only
around $0.47 per $100 to raise around $7,233 per student.233 Put
differently, before the tax-recapture law in Texas, poor communities had
to tax their residents at higher rates and spend a higher percentage of their
general funds on schooling, yet they were still unable to provide
anywhere near the same education for their residents as the wealthier

228. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (West 2019) (repealed 2019).
229. See Aliyya Swaby, Many See “Robin Hood” as a Villain. But Lawmakers Rely on It to
Pay for Schools, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/01/
31/texas-robin-hood-recapture-villain-texas-fix-school-finance [https://perma.cc/6UP7-6FMC]
(describing how schools are funded in large part via property taxes in Texas and how the prior
system contributed to inequality).
230. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
231. Id.
232. See id. at 393.
233. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/3

46

Rushin and Michalski: Police Funding

POLICE FUNDING

2020]

323

districts. This resulted in massive inequality in educational facilities,
teacher pay, student-to-teacher ratios, and more.234
In 1989, in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,235 the
Texas Supreme Court held that this sort of system for funding local
school districts violated the Texas Constitution.236 The Texas
Constitution states:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall
be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of
an efficient system of public free schools.237
Based on the above findings, the court held that the Texas system
failed to provide students with an “efficient” system that promoted the
“general diffusion of knowledge.”238 And it held that to remedy this lack
of equal access to general education, the state must ensure that
“districts . . . have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil
at similar levels of tax effort” to ensure that “[c]hildren who live in poor
districts and children who live in rich districts [are] afforded a
substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.”239
The recapture law known colloquially as the Robin Hood law was the
Texas legislature’s response to Edgewood and subsequent similar
cases.240 The current version of the law guarantees every school district a
set amount of money (currently set at $5,140 per student).241 On top of
this, schools can receive additional resources per student based on
“geographic factors” like the local cost-of-living adjustments to account
for the differences in costs between large cities and smaller rural areas.242
The Texas law allocates additional money to school districts that service

234. See Christie Bybee, What to Know About the ‘Robin Hood’ School Funding System,
AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:46 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/2018
1213/what-to-know-about-robin-hood-school-funding-system [https://perma.cc/SG2J-S6VU].
235. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
236. Id. at 393–94.
237. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
238. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394–96 (walking through the history of the term “efficient,”
disregarding claims that efficiency suggests cost effectiveness and, instead, concluding that the
intent in passing this portion of the Texas Constitution was to ensure a “general diffusion of
knowledge” across the state).
239. Id. at 397.
240. See id. at 394; Swaby, supra note 229.
241. Aliyya Swaby, Texas’ School Finance System is Unpopular and Complex. Here’s How
It Works., TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/02/15/texasschool-funding-how-it-works [https://perma.cc/32HK-BJR4].
242. Id.
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lower-income students and students with disabilities.243 The law also
establishes minimums for local property taxes—currently set at around
$1 per $100 of property value—to ensure that, even in wealthy districts,
taxpayers are allocating a similar percentage of their assessed property
value towards public education.244 When this minimum tax threshold
results in excess revenue in wealthier districts (that is, when it results in
an amount greater than the $5,140 per student mandated by the state law),
this money is then redistributed to poorer districts to ensure that they have
similar resources per student as the wealthier districts.245
For instance, consider the Austin Independent School District (AISD).
As property values have skyrocketed between 2014 and 2018, the city has
taken in significantly more property-tax revenue.246 But since the student
population has stayed relatively flat, much of this new property-tax
revenue has not gone to Austin schools but has instead been redistributed
to poorer school districts around the state.247 Conversely, in poorer
communities like the Boles Independent School District (BISD), the
schools rely primarily on money obtained from wealthier school districts
such as Austin.248 Without this Robin Hood plan in place, wealthier
communities like AISD could levy far lower property taxes on their
residents and obtain significantly more revenue per student than poorer
communities like BISD. Were this the case, AISD would also have far
more resources left over to spend on other community services than
Boles. This would seemingly result in, as the court posited in Edgewood,
“a cycle of poverty” for communities like BISD, “from which there is no
opportunity to free themselves.”249
The challenges facing Texas before the implementation of the Robin
Hood tax-recapture law closely resemble the current challenges facing
American policing. Like Texas schools before the recapture plan,
American policing is currently marred by widespread inequality. Because
most jurisdictions rely heavily on revenue generated from local taxes to
fund local policing, wealthier communities with fewer public-safety
concerns can often afford to levy similar or even lower taxes to acquire
higher amounts of revenue. This exacerbates inequality, leaving wealthy
areas with more resources to allocate to community services other than
policing as compared to many poorer areas.

243. Id. (noting that “districts receive an additional 20 percent for each low-income student”
but “these calculations haven’t been adjusted in decades”).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Swaby, supra note 229.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
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The Authors believe that this kind of recapture and redistribution
program is both feasible and normatively desirable. First, this proposal
appropriately recognizes public safety and law enforcement as public
goods that ought to be distributed across a population according to need,
not according to ability to pay—even if there is no comparable
constitutional right to public safety in the same way that many states have
established constitutional rights to free public education. Professor
Tracey L. Meares has persuasively made a similar argument. She has
claimed that the United States should “recenter policing’s fundamental
nature as a public good.”250 As she explains, society generally thinks of
goods such as public infrastructure (for example, highways and public
water supplies) as public goods—meaning that “anyone can enjoy [these
goods] without diminishing their supply, and no one . . . can be excluded
[from these goods] even if they” are not able to afford them.251 As Meares
argues, “[d]isadvantaged communities ought not give up policing any
more than they should give up public schools, electricity, or water.”252
Nevertheless, Meares is careful to emphasize that “policing” does not just
include the public-safety services delivered by law enforcement, like the
investigation of and response to criminal acts. Policing as a public good
should also include “better training of police, attention to community
policing, caring for the most vulnerable, focusing on officer safety and
wellness, and ensuring accountability and oversight of police.”253 To the
extent that one views high-quality, professional policing as a public good,
this Article’s data makes it clear that this public good is not equally
available to all residents of the United States—due in large part to the
wide funding disparities that currently exist across agencies. As a
normative policy matter, this seems undesirable and inconsistent with
how society treats other public goods.
Second, this Article’s proposal would help communities address
evolving criminal justice needs in a manner that does not greatly reduce
the availability of resources for other community services. Take as an
example the evidence uncovered by a recent report issued by The Center
for Popular Democracy et al.254 In its analysis, it found that Oakland,
California, spends $594 per capita on policing, which amounts to 41.2%
of its general fund expenditures.255 By contrast, further south in the same
state, Los Angeles spends only $381 per capita on policing, which
250. Tracey L. Meares, Policing: A Public Good Gone Bad, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2017), http://
bostonreview.net/law-justice/tracey-l-meares-policing-public-good-gone-bad [https://perma.cc/
6LDA-24K4].
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. HAMAJI ET AL., supra note 37.
255. Id. at 2.
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amounts to a mere 25.7% of its general fund expenditures.256 These
differences in the amount spent on policing per capita are, at least in part,
likely the consequence of the different public-safety challenges that each
city faces. In 2017, Oakland experienced around 1,299 violent crimes and
5,983 property crimes per 100,000 residents.257 By comparison, Los
Angeles reported only 761 violent crimes and 2,536 property crimes per
100,000 residents—meaning that Oakland faced violent and property
crime rates that were 71% and 136% higher, respectively, than Los
Angeles.258 To manage these public-safety challenges, Oakland is forced
to allocate a higher percentage of its general fund expenditures towards
policing than Los Angeles, leaving even less resources for other social
services that might further alleviate crime.
But what if California adopted a recapture program, similar to that
used in Texas to fund schools, to redistribute a portion of local tax
revenue to the support of local law enforcement across the state? This
recapture program could ensure that both police departments have a
similar amount of resources per capita to provide public-safety services.
The law could require that cities such as Oakland with greater needs for
public-safety services because of their underlying crime rates have more
resources per capita compared to lower crime communities. And by
forcing municipalities to share the burden of funding local law
enforcement across the state, such a law could ensure that both Oakland
and Los Angeles spend a comparable amount of their respective budgets
on public safety, leaving adequate resources for other social services.
Third, having the state collect and redistribute public-safety funds in
the manner that this Article describes would also give the state a natural
lever to force jurisdictions to allocate these resources in a manner that
does not just promote the coercive enforcement of criminal laws but also
promotes legitimacy through the supporting of officer-accountability
efforts. For example, the state could regulate how jurisdictions receiving
recapture and redistributed property tax money use these resources. The
state could set minimum salaries to ensure that poorer police departments
could stay competitive with richer communities in attracting top talent to
their police departments. The state could also mandate that each
jurisdiction receiving these funds allocate a specified percentage of them
towards training, internal affairs, and other officer-accountability efforts.
This would avoid the limitations of the current funding model, where
256. Id.
257. Table 8, California: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City, 2017, FBI: UCR
(2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-8/table-8state-cuts/california.xls [https://perma.cc/B893-M285] (using the population and crime numbers
listed for Oakland, California, to calculate).
258. Id. (using the population and crime numbers listed for Los Angeles, California, to
calculate).
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some police departments barely have the resources to keep officers on the
streets (let alone invest in additional training and oversight) while wellresourced departments have an extensive ability in these enterprises. And
while, admittedly, forced investment into accountability apparatuses is no
guarantee that the department will implement them effectively, it would
at least force jurisdictions to properly fund these activities. This would be
an important and necessary first step in promoting officer accountability
within these organizations.
B. Potential Drawbacks
This Article’s proposal would obviously come with some significant
drawbacks that states must consider before implementing it. First, as seen
in Part I, massive inequality exists not just in police departments within
states but also from one state to the next. For example, as seen in Figures
1 and 2, portions of the Deep South, Upper Plains, and Appalachia appear
to have concentrated pockets of comparatively low funding of local law
enforcement. And entire states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia appear to generally allocate less
money to officer salaries and other police expenditures. This proposal for
a state-level recapture and redistribution of local tax dollars to equalize
funding according to need would presumably do little good if an entire
state suffers from a lack of wealth and adequate funding. This is a
legitimate critique and a potential weakness of this proposal. It would
certainly not resolve all of the inequality currently present in the funding
of local police departments. Ultimately, the U.S. Constitution does not
provide any obvious avenue by which Congress could easily resolve these
funding inequalities. While Congress has the power to regulate local
police departments when their behavior runs afoul of the U.S.
Constitution, the funding of local policing remains a state and local
prerogative.
And even if this Article’s proposal cannot remedy the large-scale
imbalances in funding between states, it can, at minimum, alleviate some
of the inequality that exists between agencies within the same state.
Further, the federal government does have some limited tools that it can
use to remedy inequality in funding between police departments. As
Professor Rachel Harmon has described in detail, the federal government
currently administers numerous grant programs that provide limited
funding to local police departments.259 If Congress deems the inequality
in police funding between states to be a sufficiently serious problem as to
warrant federal action, it could always increase federal grants to
259. See generally Harmon, supra note 39 (providing a thorough summary of how the federal
government currently funnels some money and resources into local police departments through
various grant programs).
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underfunded police departments.260 Nothing in this Article’s proposal
keeps Congress from taking such action. Of course, such federal
assistance could come with its own limitations. Recipients of federal
grants may eagerly accept the federal assistance but thereafter simply
reallocate existing resources to other important needs (for example,
schools, infrastructure, or community services), leaving the local law
enforcement agency roughly equally situated as before the grant. But this
reshuffling of funding may ultimately result in poorer communities
having additional resources for community services, as many
abolitionists and defunding supporters have requested.
Second, localities may find this level of financial regulation unduly
coercive, leaving local communities with little autonomy in deciding how
to allocate their resources to best serve their communities. This is a
legitimate concern that can be remedied. For example, in implementing
the education recapture law in Texas, the state permits school districts to
request voter approval locally to increase property taxes from $1.04 per
$100 of property value (the usual cap under the law) to as high as $1.17
per $100 of property value if the school district chooses to fund additional
programs or extracurriculars.261 This means that, while property taxes are
typically capped and redistributed among school districts according to
need, the law still provides some avenues for communities to
democratically choose to increase their expenditures on certain
educational programs. It is easy to imagine states crafting a similar
compromise for local police department funding under this Article’s
proposal. While states could establish set property and sales tax levels
that will be redistributed among all jurisdictions according to their publicsafety needs, states could also allow some limited experimentation for
communities to raise additional revenues to address unique local needs,
experiment with new technologies, or make other investments that local
officials deem necessary or important.
Third, this Article’s proposed requirement that communities allocate
a specified percentage of their policing budget to training and
accountability may face significant local pushback. However, even if
states opt against this portion of the proposal, there are other ways that
states could accomplish these same goals in a manner that may seem less
coercive than micromanaging local budgets. In addition to equalizing
funding, states could take a more active role in mandating both academy
and in-service training of police. They could regulate minimum
260. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 391–94
(2011) (providing a detailed plan for how Congress could use its spending power to increase
investments into local police departments in a manner that promotes officer-accountability
efforts).
261. Swaby, supra note 241.
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acceptable salaries for law enforcement officers. They could make it
easier to decertify officers that have been terminated because of
professional misconduct.262 They could rollback some portions of their
law enforcement officer bills of rights or equivalent statutes that impede
accountability efforts.263 They could limit the scope of collective
bargaining to prevent municipalities from bargaining away the ability to
investigate, discipline, and fire officers found responsible for
professional misconduct.264 And they could mandate impartial
investigations of officer misconduct and the use of deadly force.265 No
doubt, there are numerous ways that states could force local police
departments to more seriously prioritize police accountability relative to
other law enforcement prerogatives. Regardless of pushback, forcing
departments to allocate the requisite resources towards accountability
may ultimately prove to be one of the most effective ways to ensure that
agencies properly prioritize these objectives.
CONCLUSION
Demands by civil rights activists to defund the police ought to be
taken seriously. In many communities, every local tax dollar that goes to
policing is a tax dollar that is no longer available for schools and other
government services. When many police departments appear to use these
resources in a manner that disproportionately harms communities of
color, defunding may seem like the only remaining option. But as this
Article illustrates, policy makers should resist this urge. Adequate
funding is necessary for high-quality policing. By defunding police
departments, communities would likely impair the ability of the police
departments to control crime. Defunding would hurt policeaccountability efforts by leaving fewer resources to train, oversee, or
discipline officers. With fewer resources, police departments may seek
additional revenue through potentially harmful means such as excessive
ticketing or civil asset forfeitures. And defunded agencies may ultimately
lower officer salaries, thereby limiting recruitment of qualified personnel
262. See Goldman, supra note 214, at 150–53.
263. See generally Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 185 (2005) (coding all fourteen law enforcement officer bills of rights in existence at the
time and noting at various times how these laws can frustrate accountability).
264. See generally Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2017)
(arguing for more transparency in collective bargaining negotiations or, alternatively, limiting the
scope of subjects up for bargaining to prevent cities from negotiating away basic accountability
mechanisms).
265. See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring
Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 137 (2015) (supporting the use of independent prosecutors to ensure impartiality in
investigations and prosecutions of police killings of civilians).
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and contributing to disciplinary shifting. While the urge to defund police
departments is understandable, these potential drawbacks ought to give
policy makers significant reservations before undertaking widespread
defunding efforts. Ultimately, it seems that you get what you pay for. And
if you can’t pay for much, you don’t get much. Elsewhere, society
generally recognizes that underfunded institutions tend to underperform.
For example, poor schools with underpaid teachers, missing staff, and
crumbling facilities will likely underperform compared to their richer
peers. Police departments are likely no different.
Nevertheless, as this Article outlines, the current approach to funding
local police departments is broken. By relying on local property and sales
taxes, the current system has produced massive inequality in police
funding. This forces some poorer communities to levy higher taxes and
allocate a higher percentage of their general funds towards policing,
leaving fewer scarce resources to invest in other government services. We
believe that our proposal to equalize the funding of local police
departments according to need more appropriately recognizes policing as
a public good. And this Article’s proposal to require municipalities to
earmark specific percentages of these recaptured and redistributed tax
dollars for officer accountability would help ensure that all communities
have not just equal access to policing services but high-quality policing
services. This would likely ensure that localities have sufficient resources
to provide high-quality policing without drawing limited resources away
from other community initiatives.
Ultimately, though, this Article’s aim is not to end a debate but to start
it. The Authors hope that this Article is just the beginning of a broader
conversation about the importance of equitable police funding.
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